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Abstract
This paper studies a competitive general equilibrium model with default and endogenous
collateral constraints. Even though all collateralized contracts are allowed, the possibility
and desirability of trade in spot markets (or the equivalent trade in ex ante asset backed
securities) creates externalities, as spot prices (or security prices) and the bindingness of
collateral constraints interact. We show that if agents are allowed to contract ex ante
on market fundamentals determining the state-contingent spot price, over and above con-
tracting on true underlying states of the world, then competitive equilibria with bundled
securities and commodities and with endogenous collateral constraints are equivalent with
Pareto optima. Examples show that it is possible to have multiple market fundamentals in
equilibrium. Equivalently, it is possible for there to be segregation into distinct competitive
securities exchanges with endogenous (positive and negative) entry fees. Fees accrue to
borrowers who are otherwise collateral constrained.
Keywords: default; endogenous collateral; externalities; segregated exchanges; Walrasian
equilibrium; limited commitment
1. Introduction
This paper uses a competitive general equilibrium with directly-collateralized and asset-
backed securities to analyze the interaction between the endogenous valuation of collateral
and corresponding default decisions. The interaction creates an “externality”, which causes
a collateral-constrained equilibrium to be ineﬃcient. The externality exists because the
consumption feasibility set of an agent directly depends on the decisions of other agents
in the contracting period through the spot prices and the prices of asset backed securities.
The impact on the feasible set in turn aﬀects the allocations of all agents whenever the
collateral or borrowing constraints of some agents are binding.
The primary contribution of this paper is not the discovery of the externality, as this is
clear from the literature, (e.g., Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986; Geanakoplos, 2003;
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Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2001; Lorenzoni, 2008), but rather a solution to the problem
using market-based, segregated exchanges in securities. This approach should be applicable
more generally to problems in which the ineﬃciency of competitive equilibrium is a result
of frictions depending on future spot prices or terms-of-trade, a pecuniary externality, e.g.,
moral hazard with retrading.
We take it as a primitive that default is possible or equivalently that collateral is required
to make borrowers (or issuers of securities) repay their loans. A borrower may choose to
default on a particular loan, or a particular state-contingent promise, and in doing so would
lose the value of collateral backing that particular loan or security. A rational borrower
will base her default decision security by security on the value of the collateral backing
each liability, compared to the original promise to pay. Of course the value of the collateral
good at the time of repayment decisions (called the execution period) and in the market
for asset backed securities (in the contract period) is an equilibrium phenomenon. Yet this
market-clearing price of collateral determines whether borrowers default or not and the
overall amount of debt.
A contract or security consists of two items, a state-contingent promise and the collateral
backing that promise. Contracts which do not default have to be backed by a suﬃcient,
minimum level of collateral, again depending on the promise and the value of collateral.
Likewise asset backed securities which are issued have to be backed in collateral by an
equivalent value of asset backed securities acquired. For every set of securities which actually
default, handing over collateral, there is another set which is equivalent, with the same
overall payoﬀ and no default. Adding up all such promises, over state-contingent security
promises directed backed by collateral and over state-contingent securities backed by the
promises of others, generates a state-contingent collateral constraint on trades in the ex
ante contract market. But contracts which do default also require collateral that is to be
handed over when the borrower does not repay. That is, partially collateralized securities
are still intimately associated with the exactly amount of collateral which serves a backing.
Again, by rescaling contracts, these constraints can be shown to be equivalent. We label
such constraints collateral constraints, for brevity.
The externality problem is considered as a missing-market problem; that is, the markets
for contracts over the “market fundamentals”, those aspects of the environment which
determine the spot-market-clearing price, are missing. The market fundamentals are, in
general, deﬁned by the distribution of the resources across types of agents. In this paper,
with identical homothetic preferences, the market fundamental is simply the aggregate ratio
of a pair of physical commodities. Note again that a market fundamental is endogenous;
that is, it depends on aggregate saving, which is a result of the actions in the trading period
of all agents as a group.
In this paper, we extend the commodity space so that contracts are contingent on
these market fundamentals and contingent contracts can be bought or sold, over and above
contracts contingent on true underlying states of the world, though securities contingent
on underlying states and market fundamentals are bundled together. Allowing agents to
contract ex-ante on market fundamentals determining the state-contingent spot-market-
clearing price in eﬀect allows them to contract on the price, and internalizes the externality.
We thus prove that the competitive equilibria with endogenous collateral constraints in the
extended commodity space are equivalent with Pareto optima. One could view these results
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as normative, indicative of the need for a systematic but market-determined way for traders
to unwind commitments.
A price island is a way to conceptualize the consistent execution of the contingencies on
fundamentals. That is, a price island speciﬁes the spot price, and the set of agents that end
up there have to support that price. This is like a club constraint in other literature, e.g.,
Prescott and Townsend (2006). Agents can carry in goods in such a way that their pre-trade
ratio of endowments in a spot market deviates from the market fundamental, but the sum
of the deviations must, by the deﬁnition of consistency, be zero. Lotteries are then a way
to assign agents to price islands jointly with other decisions such as security holdings and
end-of-trading-period collateral. In a decentralized equilibrium, in which prices are taken as
given, all price islands including out-of-equilibrium price islands are available for agents to
purchase. Speciﬁcally, we internalize the externality by making household types pay or be
paid for their inﬂuence on the spot market prices, when the pre-trade endowment ratio is
diﬀerent from the market fundamental. On another interpretation, ex post spot trades are
replaced by ex ante trade in asset backed securities. In this interpretation, a household has
to pay or be paid for the rights to trade in a particular security exchange. This is related
to the consumption right in Bisin and Gottardi (2006). Here the coupling of asset backed
securities with directly backed securities is even more natural.
We do not require that the markets keep track of individual trades and contracts, only
that the over all composition of traders be such as to deliver the contracted price. This
takes a certain commitment to prevent retrading across the “price islands.” In other words,
trades are segregated across mutually-distinct security markets. With these institutions in
place, prices will direct trade and traders eﬃciently.
More generally, endogenous collateral constraints generate a non-convexity problem, as
prices reﬂecting assignments and collateral decisions interact multiplicatively. As Prescott
and Townsend (1984b); Hansen (1985); Rogerson (1988) have shown, lotteries can (weakly)
improve on deterministic allocations when feasible sets are not convex. For computational
purposes, we allow each variable to take only ﬁnite values (ﬁnite grids).
Importantly, the amount a household pays (or receives) in unit of account in the contract
market does depend on its type, its individual endowment position relative to the market
fundamental. Again, the amount that an agent will pay (or receive) depends on the diﬀer-
ence between the market fundamental and endowment ratio of good-1 to good-2 (including
collateral holding). If her endowment ratio is exactly equal to the market fundamental,
then she does not pay (nor is paid). On the other hand, if she comes with a low (high)
endowment ratio relative to the market fundamental, i.e., holding little of good-1 and lots
of good-2 relative to the market fundamental, so that with good 1 as the numeraire, the
spot price of her abundantly held good 2 is high (as in the market there is much of good-1),
then she will pay (will be paid) for the right to trade at the speciﬁed market fundamental.
The collateralization structure in this model incorporates both “tranching” and “pyra-
miding” (see also Geanakoplos, 1997). With “tranching”, a speciﬁc piece of collateral can
be used to back up several contracts as long as their promises to pay are in diﬀerent states,
i.e., no conﬂicting claims. With“pyramiding”, agents are allowed to use ﬁnancial assets,
the contracts for promises to receive goods of others, as collateral for their own promises.
One could interpret these contracts as the asset-backed securities which are much in the
news these days, e.g., the set of securitized mortgage obligations, promises ultimately but
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indirectly backed by underlying collateral asset, e.g., houses. What actually gets traded
is an equilibrium phenomenon. This is diﬀerent from the contract-speciﬁc collateralization
structure as in Geanakoplos (2003), among others, where the collateral of a contract cannot
be used as collateral for any other contract. On the other hand, our structure is similar to
that of Lustig (2007), where several state-contingent contracts can be backed by the same
collateral.
Of course agents are allowed to retrade in spot markets, and that is what delivers the
spot-market-clearing prices. However, with pyramiding, agents are indiﬀerent between ex-
ante contracting versus retrading in spot markets. This is because anything which can be
done in the spot market, trading one good for another, can be done in the ex ante contract
market, with promises to receive one good backing promises to surrender the other. Agents
do not need to retrade in spot markets, but they may well do so. It is worth noting, however,
that most of results in this paper would obtain even without the “pyramiding” assumption.
We do so to allow for realism and generality. Even without pyramiding, state-contingent
collateral constraints generate an externality. This externality is what we seek to remedy.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on decentralization with autarky as the penalty for
reneging, e.g., Kehoe and Levine (1993); Kocherlakota (1996); Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
Similar to our model, they allow ex ante complete contracts, and focus on decentralization of
constrained optimal allocations. On the other hand, the punishment mechanism is diﬀerent
from ours, as for us defaulting agents will only lose their collateral.
The second class of related literature is on limited borrowing with assets or capital as
collateral. Our environment is similar to the environment of Geanakoplos (1997, 2003); Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997); Geanakoplos and Zame (2002); Lustig (2007); Kilenthong (2008),
among others, but our contractual structure is diﬀerent. These papers assume a contract-
speciﬁc collateralization structure while we allow for both “tranching” and “pyramiding”.
These papers, except Lustig (2007); Kilenthong (2008), follow the tradition of Bewley (1986)
and assumes exogenously incomplete markets as part of the speciﬁcation. Our paper allows
for all state-contingent contracts, but with limited collateral, so in this sense our contracts
are endogenously incomplete.
This paper also relates to ﬁnancial accelerator and crises literature, e.g., Bernanke and
Gertler (1989); Lamont (1995); Bernanke et al. (1996); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Aghion
et al. (1999); Krishnamurthy (2003); Cooley et al. (2004); Rampini (2004); Ranciere et al.
(2008). These papers use endogenous borrowing constraints as ampliﬁcation mechanisms.
Our paper is closely related to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Krishnamurthy (2003) in
that they also focus on collateral constraints. The diﬀerence is that our focuses are the
eﬃciency property of a competitive equilibrium and the decentralization of constrained
optimal allocations.
There is also a related literature on a pecuniary externality that results from retrading in
spot markets or from anonymous trading, when there is some impediment to exchange, (e.g.,
Jacklin, 1987; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Bisin
et al., 2001; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2001, 2004; Allen and Gale, 2004; Golosov and
Tsyvinski, 2007; Farhi et al., 2009; Lorenzoni, 2008). Similarly to Geanakoplos and Polemar-
chakis (1986); Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001); Farhi et al. (2009); Lorenzoni (2008),
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we are explicit about the source of the externality in our context, but we go on to propose a
market-based solution to the problem. This is also related to Makowski (1980); Pesendorfer
(1995); Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) showing that interaction among ﬁrms/intermediaries
may not create an eﬃcient set of securities because they do not necessarily internalize com-
plementarities in innovating securities. On the other hand, competitive broker dealers in
our model solve an externality problem by creating new securities/commodities costlessly.
Our results are robust to the presence of marginal or unit costs, however.
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the primitive in-
gredients of the model. We establish the existence of the externality in section 3. Section
4 deﬁnes the extended commodity space with lotteries. The constrained feasible allocation
and the Pareto program are formulated in this section. Section 5 introduces a competitive
equilibrium with lotteries and contracts over market fundamentals. In section 6, the ﬁrst
and second welfare theorems, and the existence theorem, are proved. The collateralization
structure, namely tranching and pyramiding, is articulated in section 7. Some properties
of equilibrium prices are discussed in section 8. Numerical examples are shown in section
9. Section 10 concludes the paper. Appendix A contain proofs. With limited space, some
theoretical results and derivations that are omitted from the main text are presented in the
supplementary materials.
2. The Model Economy
This is a two-period economy, 푡 = 0, 1. All contracts are traded in period-0, henceforth
called the “contracting period”. In addition, in period-0, both of two consumption goods
can be traded and consumed, and one of them can be saved. All contracts will be executed
in period-1, henceforth called the “execution period”. There are a ﬁnite number 푆 of
possible states of nature in period-1, i.e., 푠 = 1, 2, ..., 푆. This allows 푆 = 1 so there is only
intertemporal trade. Let 0 < 휋푠 < 1 be the objective and commonly assessed probability of
state 푠 occurring, where
∑
푠 휋푠 = 1. The two goods can be traded and consumed in each
state 푠. We refer to these as spot markets.
Again there are two goods, called good-1 and good-2. Good-1 cannot be stored (is
completely perishable) from 푡 = 0 to 푡 = 1, while good-2 is storable. The good-2 that
can be stored is collateralizable, i.e., can serve as collateral to back promises. Henceforth,
good-2 and collateral good will be used interchangeably. Furthermore, good-1 will be the
numeraire good in every date and state.
There is a continuum of agents of measure one. The agents are divided into 퐻 types,
each of which is indexed by ℎ = {1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 퐻}. Each type ℎ consists of 훼ℎ ∈ (0, 1) fraction
of the population such that
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ = 1. Each agent type ℎ is endowed with good-1 and
good-2, eℎ0 =
(
푒ℎ10, 푒
ℎ
20
)
in period-0 and eℎ푠 =
(
푒ℎ1푠, 푒
ℎ
2푠
)
, in each state 푠 = 1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 푆. Let
eℎ =
(
eℎ0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , eℎ푆
)
be the endowment proﬁle of agent type ℎ over period-0 and all states 푠
in period-1. Heterogeneity of agents originates in part from the endowment proﬁles eℎ. As
a notational convention, vectors or matrices will be represented by bold letters.
Let 푘ℎ ∈ R+ denote the collateral holding (equivalent to the holding of good-2) of an
agent type ℎ at the end of period-0. Note that this collateral allocation does not need to be
equal to his initial endowment of good-2. In particular, since good-2 can be exchanged in
the contracting period (at date 푡 = 0), 푘ℎ will be equal to the net-position in the collateral
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good after trading in period-0. The collateral good as legal collateral backing claims is
assumed to be kept in escrow, and cannot be taken away either by borrowers or lenders.
However, the holding of good-2 can also include normal saving. The storage technology
of good-2 whether in collateral or normal saving is linear but potentially with a random
return. In some applications, it is natural to treat the returns as a constant, and focus
on how collateral interacts with intertemporal trade. In other applications, the risk is in
the collateral itself, i.e., what happens if housing values could fall (as if in a small open
economy). Each unit of good-2 stored will become 푅푠 units of good-2 in state 푠 = 1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 푆.
Speciﬁcally, storing 퐼 units of good-2 at date-0 will deliver 푅푠퐼 units of good-2 in state
푠. It is noteworthy that the results in this paper are valid even if the technology 푅 is not
random. In most of the exposition, uncertainty originates in the endowment, primarily.
Preferences are identically homothetic. The preferences of agent type ℎ are represented
by the utility function 푈
(
푐ℎ1 , 푐
ℎ
2
)
: R2+ → R, where
(
푐ℎ1 , 푐
ℎ
2
)
are the consumption of good-1
and good-2 of agent ℎ, respectively. Let 0 < 훽 ≤ 1 be the common discount factor. The
discounted von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility of ℎ is thus
U ℎ
(
cℎ
)
≡ 푈
(
푐ℎ10, 푐
ℎ
20
)
+ 훽
푆∑
푠=1
휋푠푈
(
푐ℎ1푠, 푐
ℎ
2푠
)
where, as with the notation for endowments, cℎ =
(
cℎ0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , cℎ푆
)
is the consumption alloca-
tion with cℎ0 ≡
(
푐ℎ10, 푐
ℎ
20
) ∈ R2+ and cℎ푠 ≡ (푐ℎ1푠, 푐ℎ2푠) ∈ R2+ for 푠 = 1, . . . , 푆 as the consumption
of good-1 and good-2 in period-0, in state 푠, respectively. The utility function satisﬁes
Assumption 1. For each agent type ℎ, common utility function 푈
(
푐ℎ1 , 푐
ℎ
2
)
is homothetic,
continuous, strictly concave, strictly increasing in both arguments, and satisﬁes the usual
Inada conditions.
Homotheticity will allow us closed form solutions in the determination of spot prices. Risk
aversion with random endowments motivates trade in state-contingent securities. Hetero-
geneous intertemporal endowments motivates trade in bonds. We will on occasion put
superscript ℎ on the utility function for clarity, but preference heterogeneity is not an es-
sential part of what we do here.
2.1. Market Fundamentals
Agents can trade in spot markets in each state 푠. In principle, the market-clearing prices
in these spot markets depend on the distribution of pre-trade (before ex-post spot trade)
endowments or the composition of agents. To be precise, let 푧푠 be a market fundamental
that determines the spot-market-clearing price in state 푠, and accordingly the spot-price
function is deﬁned by 푝(푧푠).
With identical homothetic preferences, the aggregate ratio of good-1 to good-2 in state
푠 is the market fundamental in state 푠; that is, 푧푠 =
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푒ℎ1푠
푅푠퐾+
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푒ℎ2푠
, where 퐾 =
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푘ℎ is
the aggregate (endogenous) saving including collateral. Here then the spot price function
can be represented by a single-valued function 푝(푧푠) such that 푝(푧푠) = 푝(푧
′
푠) implies that
푧푠 = 푧
′
푠. In other words, the market fundamental is necessary and suﬃcient to pin down
the spot price. This ensures that working with spot prices is equivalent to working with
market fundamentals. We summarize:
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Lemma 1. With identical homothetic preferences, the market fundamental in state 푠 is
given by
푧푠 =
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푒ℎ1푠
푅푠퐾 +
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푒ℎ2푠
(1)
Market clearing price 푝(푧푠) is a one-to-one function, i.e. 푝(푧푠) is a single-valued, and
푝(푧푠) = 푝(푧
′
푠) implies that 푧푠 = 푧
′
푠. In addition, with strictly concavity of 푈(⋅), 푝(푧푠) is
strictly monotone increasing.
Condition (1) is called a consistency constraint. It ensures that the market fundamental
is consistently well-deﬁned. That is, 푝(푧푠) is exactly the spot price that constitutes a spot
market equilibrium. This is an implication of the homotheticity assumption.
2.2. Collateralization Structure
A speciﬁc piece of collateral can be used to back up several contracts as long as their
promises to pay are in diﬀerent states. Thus, there is no conﬂict in a given state 푠. This is
known as tranching. This is distinct from the contract-speciﬁc collateralization structure (in
Geanakoplos, 2003, among others), in which the collateral of a given security cannot be used
as collateral for any other security. For full generality here, we will consider state-contingent
securities as the primitives and otherwise let the security structure be endogenous. Accord-
ingly, we focus on securities paying in each state 푠 with market fundamental 푧푠, one at a
time.
A (contingent) security promising to pay one unit of good 1 in period-1 and state 푠 with
퐶ˆ units of good 2 as collateral is a promise to pay a unit of good 1 if the state of nature is 푠
and nothing otherwise. For notational convenience, we use ˆ to distinguish securities paying
in good 1, the numeraire, from securities paying in good 2. With limited commitment, that
is, allowing default, the payoﬀ of this security is given by
퐷ˆ =
{
min
(
1, 퐶ˆ푅푠푝(푧푠)
)
if state is 푠
0 otherwise
(2)
where this payoﬀ is in units of good 1 in period 푡 = 1, and 푝(푧푠) is the price of good 2 (in
units of good 1) in state 푠. Note that this defaulting condition depends on the spot price
푝(푧푠).
Equation (2) captures the essence of limited commitment problem in this model. The
issuer or “borrower” in period 푡 = 0 may not wish to honor the state-contingent obligation.
This creates the limited commitment problem; that is, she will keep the promise if that
promise is no larger than the value of the collateral, i.e., 1 ≤ 퐶ˆ푅푠푝(푧푠), and will “default”
otherwise, 퐶ˆ푅푠푝(푧푠) < 1. In case of default, the payoﬀ of the contract in state 푠 is equal to
the value of its collateral in that state, 퐶ˆ푅푠푝(푧푠) units of good 1.
We will ﬁrst show that there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to securities
without default, and also in excluding over-collateralized securities, whose collateral value
is strictly larger than the promise. We prove the result for a security paying in good 1 in
state 푠 with good 2 as collateral. Then, we will argue that the same logic applies for all
other types of securities.
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Now consider a contingent security that will be in default in state 푠, with collateral
퐶ˆ < 1푅푠푝(푧푠) . That is, an issuer of this security will “default” in state 푠. Hence, according
to condition (2), the payoﬀ of this security (in units of good 1) in state 푠 is
min
(
1, 퐶ˆ푅푠푝(푧푠)
)
= 퐶ˆ푅푠푝(푧푠) < 1 (3)
We now argue that there is an alternative security that does not default but generates
exactly the same total payoﬀs using the same amount of collateral overall. Consider a state-
푠 contingent security with collateral amount 퐶˜ = 1푅푠푝(푧푠) . This security will not default. It
is straightforward to show that the payoﬀ of this security is one unit of good 1 in state 푠.
Now consider 퐶ˆ푅푠푝(푧푠) units of the alternative security. That collection of securities pays
in state 푠 one per unit or 퐶ˆ푅푠푝(푧푠) in total. This is exactly the same as the payoﬀ of the
original security with default: see (3). In addition, the total collateral for 퐶ˆ푅푠푝(푧푠) units
of the alternative security with 1푅푠푝(푧푠) collateral per unit is 퐶ˆ, which is exactly the same as
the collateral level of the original security. Therefore, the alternative security can generate
the same payoﬀs using the same total amount of collateral but without default.
A similar argument also applies to all other types of securities, including directly-
collateralized securities paying in good-2 rather than good-1, and asset-backed securities,
which will be precisely deﬁned later. For now deﬁne an asset-backed security as a contract
backed by promises to receive goods of others. This is termed pyramiding. The details of
asset-backed securities will be discussed in Section 7.
The discussion is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any state-contingent security, there exists a security with no default that
can generate the same total payoﬀs using the same amount of collateral.
Thus, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to no-default securities only.
Further, issuing securities that do default requires no less collateral than (an equivalent set
of) securities that do not. In other words and this may seem counterintuitive, securities
with default, i.e., with little collateral, do not economize on collateral. In addition, we
also show in the supplementary materials that default cannot make collateral constraints,
formally deﬁned below, less binding.
In addition, with perfectly divisible collateral, there is no loss of generality in excluding
over-collateralized securities, whose collateral value is strictly larger than the promise. More
precisely, an over-collateralized security paying in good-1 in state 푠 is a contract with a
collateral 퐶ˆ such that 퐶ˆ푅푠푝(푧푠) > 1. The payoﬀ of this security in state 푠 is 1. This
security is equivalent to a no-default security with 1푅푠푝(푧푠) < 퐶ˆ units of good-2 as collateral,
whose payoﬀ in state 푠 is also 1. A similar result applies to other types of securities as well.
It is worthy of emphasis, however, that own saving should not be interpreted as over-
collateralization, as no securities are acquired from others; that is, each agent can save. This
saving will result in the slackness of the collateral constraint (4) deﬁned below. In particular,
an agent may hold at the end of period-0 more collateral good than the (minimum) amount
needed to collateralize all securities issued.
3. Collateral Constraints and Externality
As will be proved in Section 7 (see Lemma 4), there is no loss of generality in considering
only two classes of securities; (푖) 휃ˆℎ푠 - securities paying in good 1 in state 푠, (푖푖) 휃
ℎ
푠 - securities
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paying in good 2 in state 푠. Here a positive number denotes the purchaser or holder , and
negative the issuer. When negative, each of the state-contingent securities must be backed
by the issuer either by good-2 or by purchased assets (other people’s promises). In other
words, 휃ˆℎ푠 and 휃
ℎ
푠 include both directly collateralized and asset-backed securities. As well
be established in Section 7, the collateral constraints for an agent type ℎ take the intuitive
form
푝(푧푠)푅푠푘
ℎ + 휃ˆℎ푠 + 푝(푧푠)휃
ℎ
푠 ≥ 0, ∀푠 (4)
The collateral constraint (4) states that, for each state 푠, the net-value of all assets,
including collateral good and securities, must be non-negative. If 휃ˆℎ푠 and 휃
ℎ
푠 were negative,
we could write this as 푝(푧푠)푅푠푘
ℎ ≥ −휃ˆℎ푠 − 푝(푧푠)휃ℎ푠 . That is, there is suﬃcient collateral in
value in state 푠 to honor the value of all promises. Since 휃ˆℎ푠 and 휃
ℎ
푠 include asset-backed and
directly backed securities, collateral types per se do not matter. In addition, we can show
that the markets economize on collateral; that is, there is no gain from pooling collateral
across agents type h (see Lemma 9 in Appendix A).
The collateral constraints (4) can be written in consumption space as follows. Suppose
for the moment that securities are such that there is no spot trade in equilibrium (see
Lemma 5). The consumption for an agent type ℎ in state 푠 is given by
푐ℎ1푠 = 푒
ℎ
1푠 + 휃ˆ
ℎ
푠 (5)
푐ℎ2푠 = 푒
ℎ
2푠 +푅푠푘
ℎ + 휃ℎ푠 (6)
Substituting these two equations into the collateral constraint (4) yields
푐ℎ1푠 + 푝(푧푠)푐
ℎ
2푠 ≥ 푒ℎ1푠 + 푝(푧푠)푒ℎ2푠 (7)
This condition implies that, due to limited commitment and the possibility of default, the
market value of consumption in a state 푠 of an agent cannot be lower than the market value
of her endowment (without collateral 푘ℎ) in the same state (related to Kehoe and Levine,
1993; Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2007, among others). Intuitively, if this constraint were to
be violated, an agent type ℎ would have promised to deliver some part of the value of her
endowments, over and above her consumption, but such promises require collateral.
The interaction between the bindingness of collateral constraints and spot prices gener-
ates an externality. Technically, there is an externality because the consumption feasibility
set of an agent type ℎ depends on other agents’ choices of saving 푘ℎ˜ through the spot price.
This dependency results from the collateral constraints1 (7), or borrowing constraints in
general. If there were no collateral constraint, the consumption feasibility set would be
independent of other agents’ choices (and therefore there would be no externality). Intu-
itively, an inﬁnitesimal agent has no inﬂuence on aggregate saving. On the other hand, a
1This is true even we allow for directly-collateralized securities paying in good 2, 휓ℎ푠 only. As precisely
described in Section 7, each agent will also face a spot trade constraint:
휏ℎ1푠 + 푝(푧푠)휏
ℎ
2푠 = 0
where 휏ℎ푖푠 is the amount of good 푖 an agent ℎ received from trading in the spot market in state 푠. Combining
this spot trade constraint with (4), (5), and (6) leads to the collateral constraint (7).
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constrained planner knows she can inﬂuence the resource allocation in period 1 through
period 0 assignments, namely saving. The asymmetry between the inﬂuence of the planner
versus induced agents generates an ineﬃciency when a collateral constraint is binding. We
now present the formal statement below. For simplicity, we focus on identical allocations
for each type.
3.1. Collateral Constrained Optimality
Attainable allocations are those that can be achieved by exchanges of securities and
collateral in date 0 and exchanges of consumption goods in date 1 at state 푠, respecting spot
prices 푝(푧푠). Accordingly, attainable allocations are deﬁned using the spot-price function
푝(푧푠). As will be later proved in this section (see Lemma 5), the asset-backed securities
in this model are simply substitutes for spot markets. Henceforth, we let asset-backed
securities play this role and shut down active trade in spot markets.
Deﬁnition 1. An allocation
(
cℎ0 , 푘
ℎ, 휃ˆℎ푠 , 휃
ℎ
푠
)
ℎ
is attainable if
(i) it satisﬁes resource constraints: ∑
ℎ
훼ℎ푐ℎ10 ≤
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ푒ℎ10 (8)∑
ℎ
훼ℎ
[
푐ℎ20 + 푘
ℎ
]
≤
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ푒ℎ20 (9)∑
ℎ
훼ℎ휃ˆℎ푠 = 0, ∀푠 (10)∑
ℎ
훼ℎ휃ℎ푠 = 0, ∀푠 (11)
(ii) for each ℎ, it satisﬁes the collateral constraints (4),
(iii) the consistency constraints (1) hold for all 푠.
With non-constant, 푠-contingent spot-price function, the attainable set is non-convex.
The non-constant price condition is typical. For instance, this is the case with identi-
cal homothetic and strictly concave preferences. The main source of the non-convexity
is the product of spot-price function and the sum of collateral and contract allocations,
푝(푧푠)
(
푅푠푘
ℎ + 휃ℎ푠
)
, in the collateral constraints (4).
Lemma 3. With identical homothetic and concave preferences, the attainable set is non-
convex.
A constrained optimal allocation is characterized using the following planner’s problem.
Let U
ℎ
be the reservation utility level for an agent type ℎ.
Deﬁnition 2. The Pareto Program without Lotteries:
max
(cℎ0 ,푘ℎ,휃ˆℎ,휃ℎ)ℎ
푈
(
푐110, 푐
1
20
)
+ 훽
∑
푠
휋푠푈
(
푒11푠 + 휃ˆ
1
푠 , 푒
1
2푠 +푅푠푘
1 + 휃1푠
)
(12)
10
subject to (1), (4), (8)-(11), the participation constraint for each ℎ = 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 퐻,
푈
(
푐ℎ10, 푐
ℎ
20
)
+ 훽
∑
푠
휋푠푈
(
푒ℎ1푠 + 휃ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 푒
ℎ
2푠 +푅푠푘
ℎ + 휃ℎ푠
) ≥ U ℎ, (13)
and non-negativity constraints for consumption and collateral allocations.
For expositional reasons, we focus only on interior solutions; that is, the non-negativity
constraint for 푘ℎ is neglected without loss of generality here. Let 휇ℎ푐푐−푠, and 휇ℎ푢¯ denote
the Lagrange multipliers for the collateral constraint (4) for agent ℎ in state 푠, and for
the participation constraint (13) for agent ℎ, respectively. For notational convenience, let
휇1푢¯ = 1. A necessary condition
2 for constrained optimality related to collateral allocation
푘ℎ is given by, for any ℎ,
푈ℎ20
푈ℎ10
=
∑
푠
휋푠훽
푈ℎ2푠
푈ℎ10
푅푠 +
∑
푠
휇ℎ푐푐−푠
휇ℎ푢¯푈
ℎ
10
푝(푧푠)푅푠 −
∑
푠
훼ℎ
휇ℎ푢¯푈
ℎ
10
푝′(푧푠)
푝(푧푠)
∂푧푠
∂퐾
∑
ℎ˜
휇ℎ˜푐푐−푠휃ˆ
ℎ˜
푠 (14)
where 푈ℎ푖0 =
∂푈ℎ(푐ℎ10,푐ℎ20)
∂푐푖0
, 푈ℎ푖푠 =
∂푈ℎ(푐ℎ1푠,푐ℎ2푠)
∂푐푖푠
for 푖 = 1, 2, 푝′(푧푠) =
∂푝(푧푠)
∂푧푠
, and 퐾 =
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푘ℎ.
See the derivation in the proof of Lemma 10 in the supplementary materials.
Of special interest, the last term depends not only on the bindingness of collateral
constraints for ℎ but also the bindingness of other agents’ collateral constraints. This
implies that if an agent’s collateral constraint is binding, it will impact everyone. This is
the source of the externality.
3.2. Collateral Equilibrium
Let 푃ˆ푎푠 and 푃푎푠 be the prices of securities paying in good 1 and in good 2 in state
푠, respectively. For notational convenience, we denote the vectors of security prices by
푃ˆ푎 =
(
푃ˆ푎푠
)
푠
and 푃푎 = (푃푎푠)푠. A collateral equilibrium is deﬁned:
Deﬁnition 3. A collateral equilibrium is a speciﬁcation of prices of good 2 in period-0, 푃20,
the prices of securities paying in good 1, 푃ˆ푎, and the prices of securities paying in good 2,
푃푎, the spot price of good 2 in each state 푠, 푝(푧푠), and an allocation
(
cℎ0 , 푘
ℎ, 휃ˆℎ, 휃ℎ
)
ℎ
such
that
(i) taking prices as given, for any ℎ,
(
cℎ0 , 푘
ℎ, 휃ˆℎ, 휃ℎ
)
solves
max
(cℎ0 ,푘ℎ,휃ˆℎ,휃ℎ)
푈
(
푐ℎ10, 푐
ℎ
20
)
+ 훽
∑
푠
휋푠푈
(
푒ℎ1푠 + 휃ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 푒
ℎ
2푠 +푅푠푘
ℎ + 휃ℎ푠
)
(15)
subject to the collateral constraints (4), and the budget constraint at 푡 = 0:
푐ℎ10 + 푃20
(
푐ℎ20 + 푘
ℎ
)
+ 푃ˆ푎 ⋅ 휃ˆℎ + 푃푎 ⋅ 휃ℎ ≤ 푒ℎ10 + 푃20푒ℎ20 (16)
2Given that the constraint set is not convex (Lemma 3), this optimality condition is necessary but may
not be suﬃcient. Nevertheless, this does not cause any problem to our externality argument, as we simply
need to show that a collateral equilibrium cannot be constrained optimal, i.e. does not satisfy the necessary
optimal condition (14).
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(ii) all markets clear: (8)-(11) hold,
(iii) the consistency constraints (1) hold for all 푠.
The necessary optimal condition for a collateral equilibrium that is comparable to the
optimal condition for a constrained optimality (14) is given by, for any ℎ,
푃20 =
푈ℎ20
푈ℎ10
=
∑
푠
휋푠훽
푈ℎ2푠
푈ℎ10
푅푠 +
∑
푠
훾ℎ푐푐−푠
푈ℎ10
푝(푧푠)푅푠 (17)
where 훾ℎ푐푐−푠 is the Lagrange multiplier for the collateral constraint of contracts paying in
state 푠 for agent ℎ. See the derivation in the proof of Lemma 10 in the supplementary
materials.
3.3. The Externality
Note that an inﬁnitesimal agent takes a spot price, 푝(푧푠), as invariant. To the contrary,
the constrained planner can inﬂuence the spot prices 푝(푧푠) through collateral assignments,
푘ℎ, for the agents of type ℎ in period-0, which aﬀect the market fundamentals 푧푠. This key
inﬂuence is the term in 푝
′(푧푠)
푝(푧푠)
∂푧푠
∂퐾 . The diﬀerence between the impact of the planner and
that of the agents creates the externality and causes an ineﬃciency.
Note that if the last term in (14) is zero and we set 훾ℎ푐푐−푠 =
휇ℎ푐푐−푠
휇ℎ푢¯
, then condition (17) is
exactly the same as (14). On the other hand, if the last term in (14),
∑
푠
훼ℎ
휇ℎ푢¯푈
ℎ
10
푝′(푧푠)
푝(푧푠)
∂푧푠
∂퐾
∑
ℎ˜ 휇
ℎ˜
푐푐−푠휃ˆℎ˜푠 ,
is positive, as in all numerical examples in this paper, the equilibrium price of good-2 in
period-0 will be too high in the collateral equilibrium relative to the (constrained) optimal
one. Intuitively, the planner can do better by lowering the aggregate saving or collateral
(see Example 1).
The last term in (14) could be zero if either 휇ℎ˜푐푐−푠 = 0 for all ℎ˜ or
푝′(푧푠)
푝(푧푠)
∂푧푠
∂퐾 = 0. With a
strictly concave utility function, the spot price varies with the market fundamental3 (is not
constant), i.e. 푝
′(푧푠)
푝(푧푠)
∂푧푠
∂퐾 ∕= 0. As a result, when the collateral constraints are binding, i.e.,
휇ℎ˜푐푐−푠 > 0 for some ℎ˜, the last term in (14) will be non-zero in general. With this non-zero
term, a collateral equilibrium will not be constrained eﬃcient. It is the interaction between
the bindingness of collateral constraints and spot prices that is the key. As an exceptional
case, a collateral equilibrium could be a full ﬁrst-best optimum. That is, the environment
could be such that despite the focus of the paper we could ignore the collateral constraint.
But, otherwise, the collateral equilibrium must be constrained suboptimal. The result is
summarized in the following theorem. The proof is in the supplementary materials. In
particular, we argue that a collateral equilibrium is ﬁrst-best optimal when all collateral
constraints are slack.
3If the utility function is linear in both goods, then the spot price is constant, i.e. 푝
′(푧푠)
푝(푧푠)
∂푧푠
∂퐾
= 0. This
clearly results in constrained eﬃciency. Similarly, if the amount of aggregate saving is ﬁxed exogenously,
then the market fundamental (the ratio of good-1 to good-2) is ﬁxed. This also implies that the last term
is zero, and so constrained eﬃciency.
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Theorem 3.1. If a collateral equilibrium is not ﬁrst-best optimal, then it is constrained
suboptimal.
Intuitively, consider an economy with two representative agents. Let 퐾 = 푘1 + 푘2 be
the total saving. See ﬁgure 1a as an example of an attainable set in state 푠. 퐸ℎ푠 =
(
푒ℎ1푠, 푒
ℎ
2푠
)
is the endowment of agent ℎ in state 푠. Note that when 퐾 > 0, the endowments points of
the two agents will not coincide, and the vertical distance between them is 푅푠퐾. Indeed,
it is as if agent 2 were holding all the collateral. The collateral-constrained attainable set
is represented by the area between the parallel lines. The lower (upper) border of the
attainable set corresponds to the bindingness of agent 1’s (agent 2’s) collateral constraint
(7). As a result, when agent 1’s collateral constraint is binding, the resulting consumption
allocation will be on the lower border (e.g., point A in ﬁgure 1b), and vice versa.
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Figure 1: Collateral-constrained attainable sets. (a) Attainable allocations (the shaded area) depends on
the spot price 푝(푧푠) which depends on total saving 퐾. (b) The resulting consumption allocation will be on
the lower border of the attainable set when agent 1’s collateral constraint is binding.
Figure 2a illustrates that diﬀerent spot prices lead to diﬀerent attainable sets. Note that
lower total saving (퐾 < 퐾) implies lower slope of the boundaries of the attainable set. This
is because lower total saving implies higher spot price of good 2 relative to good 1, which in
turn implies that the slope, − 1푝(푧푠) , is lower in absolute value. As shown in the ﬁgure, when
two attainable sets with diﬀerent spot prices are overlapped, they are not contained in one
another. Hence, when agent 1’s collateral constraint is binding, the marginal change in total
saving (say, from 퐾 to 퐾) could lead to a consumption allocation that is not attainable
under the original level of total saving (the graph features a discrete change moving from
point A to new point B which is not attainable with the overall total saving 퐾). This
marginal eﬀect, therefore, is not priced in the collateral equilibrium considered thus far.
That is, there is an externality.
On the other hand, if none of the collateral constraints were binding, this dependency on
the spot price will not generate the externality. See ﬁgure 2b. With no binding collateral
constraints, the resulting consumption allocations will be strictly inside (interior of) the
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Figure 2: Collateral-constrained feasible sets. (a) Diﬀerent levels of (endogenous) aggregate saving imply
diﬀerent (overlapped) feasible sets. When agent 1’s collateral constraint is binding, changing total saving
from 퐾 to 퐾 moves the resulting consumption from A to B which is not feasible with 퐾. (b) When none
of the collateral constraints is binding, changing total saving from 퐾 to 퐾 moves the resulting consumption
from A to B, which is feasible with 퐾.
attainable set. This implies that its neighborhood is also in the attainable set. As a result,
the marginal change in total saving will lead to the resulting consumption allocation that
is still feasible under the original level of total saving (A and B are both feasible with
total saving 퐾). This implies that the collateral equilibrium prices out this marginal eﬀect.
Hence, there is no externality in this case.
4. Internalizing The Externality: The Economy with “Price-Islands”
Let z = (푧푠)
푆
푠=1 denotes a vector of the market fundamentals in all states, each of
which is called a price-island in state 푠. The composition of agents determines the market
fundamental. We can go further and interpret a price-island 푧푠 as a segregated exchange
institution in which the composition of agents forms in such a way as to deliver the market
fundamental 푧푠.
Being in island-푧푠 in state 푠 means that an agent ℎ can trade in spot markets at spot
price 푝(푧푠), as determined by the market fundamental 푧푠. Equivalently, even if the spot
markets were shut down4, an agent on an island 푧푠 can accomplish the same thing by
trading in ex-ante securities (휃ˆ푠, 휃푠), that is, trading in segregated security exchanges, in
which the prices depend on 푧푠.
4As proved in Lemma 5 in Section 7, the spot markets are redundant in that agents are indiﬀerent
between trading in ex-ante contracts or in spot markets. Importantly, the spot markets are opened.
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Let Δ푠 ∈ R deﬁne “type ℎ’s deviation from the market fundamental5” in state 푠.
Δ푠 = 푧푠
(
푒ℎ2푠 +푅푠푘
ℎ
)
− 푒ℎ1푠 =
(
푒ℎ2푠 +푅푠푘
ℎ
)(
푧푠 − 푒
ℎ
1푠
푒ℎ2푠 +푅푠푘
ℎ
)
, ∀푠 (18)
Note that if Δ푠 = 0, then
푒ℎ1푠
푒ℎ2푠+푅푠푘
ℎ = 푧푠 and type ℎ’s pre-trade endowment is exactly equal
to the market fundamental. If Δ푠 > 0, then type ℎ holds a relative low amount of good-1
and abundant amount of good-2, that is, relative to 푧푠. Adding one unit of good-2 (via
collateral 푘) adds to the deviation Δ푠 by exactly 푧푠푅푠 (see Eq.(18)). This is the same for all
agent types. But note also that there is a part of Δ푠 over which ℎ has no control, namely her
endowments. The “type ℎ deviation from the fundamental” will be priced in a competitive
equilibrium. In addition, the price of the right to trade in each island will be proportional
to the “type ℎ deviation from the fundamental”.
Now suppose it were possible to assign agents to diﬀerent islands even in state 푠 as
if by a lottery. Security trades are also bundled into this potentially random assignment.
Island assignments, by lottery or not, are still state-contingent. Importantly, a resident of
an island-푧푠 can trade securities with other residents in the same island only. Securities are
executed at spot prices within each island only.
Thus, for each agent type ℎ, let 푥ℎ(c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ) ≥ 0 denote a probability measure on(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
, where Δ푠 satisﬁes (18) for all 푠. In other words, 푥
ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
is the
probability of receiving period-0 consumption, c0 ≡ (푐10, 푐20), collateral, 푘, securities paying
in good-1, 휃ˆ푠, securities paying in good-2, 휃푠, and being in island-푧푠 in state 푠 where all
securities are executed and all spot-trade takes place also. Recall that a positive (negative)
amount of trade means receiving (transferring out) the speciﬁed good.
As a probability measure, a lottery of an agent type ℎ satisﬁes∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
= 1 (19)
With a continuum of agents, 푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
can be interpreted as the fraction of agents
type ℎ assigned to a bundle
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
. More formally, with all choice object gridded
up as an approximation, the commodity space 퐿 is assumed to be a ﬁnite 푛-dimensional
linear space6.
For notational purposes, let 푏 =
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
be a typical commodity, called a
bundle. We will use 푏 and
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
interchangeably. Accordingly, we can write
xℎ ≡ [푥ℎ(푏)]
푏
∈ R푛+ as a typical lottery for an agent type ℎ.
5If we were in the underlying spaces of 푘 and 푧푠, they would enter multiplicatively, hence and so we would
have a non convexity problem. This is not a problem with lotteries, however.
6The limiting arguments under weak-topology used in Prescott and Townsend (1984a) can be applied to
establish the results if 퐿 is not ﬁnite.
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4.1. Consumption Possibility Set
A holder of a bundle 푏 =
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
will receive 푘 units of collateral and hold
portfolio of securities
(
휃ˆ, 휃
)
. With limited commitment, each bundle 푏 will be feasible
only if the collateral and security assignments satisfy the collateral constraint (4) which we
repeat here:
푝 (푧푠)푅푠푘 + 휃ˆ푠 + 푝 (푧푠) 휃푠 ≥ 0, ∀푠 (20)
Accordingly, we impose the following condition on a probability measure 푥ℎ (푏).
푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
≥ 0 if
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
satisﬁes (18) and (20) (21)
= 0 if otherwise
In words, a positive measure can be deﬁned only on feasible bundles, which have to satisfy
conditions (18) and (20). More formally, the consumption possibility set of an agent type
ℎ is deﬁned by
푋ℎ =
{
xℎ ∈ R푛+ :
∑
푏
푥ℎ (푏) = 1, and for any 푏, 푥ℎ (푏) satisﬁes (21)
}
(22)
Let xℎ be a typical element of 푋ℎ. Note that 푋ℎ ⊂ 퐿 is compact and convex. In addition,
the non-emptiness of 푋ℎ is guaranteed by assigning mass one on each agent’s endowment.
4.2. Attainable Allocations
An attainable allocation with lotteries is deﬁned in an analogous manner to the ones
without lotteries. In particular, an allocation x ≡ (xℎ)
ℎ
is attainable if xℎ ∈ 푋ℎ for all ℎ,
and it satisﬁes the following feasibility constraints.
Recall that good-1 cannot be stored; only good-2 is storable. The aggregate endowment
of good-1 in period-0 is
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푒ℎ10. Therefore, the resource constraint for good-1 in period-0
is given by ∑
ℎ
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
훼ℎ푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
푐10 ≤
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ푒ℎ10 (23)
Similarly, the feasibility constraint for good-2 in period-0 is given by∑
ℎ
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
훼ℎ푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
[푐20 + 푘] ≤
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ푒ℎ20 (24)
Note that the nonnegativity constraint on 푘 guarantees that the aggregate saving is non-
negative.
Recall that all securities are executed within each assigned island only. In particular,
for an island-푧푠 in state 푠, the net supply of a security paying in good-1 in state 푠, 휃ˆ푠 must
be zero ∑
ℎ
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z−푠,Δ)
훼ℎ푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z−푠, 푧푠,Δ
)
휃ˆ푠 = 0 , ∀푠, 푧푠 (25)
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where z−푠 = (푧1, . . . , 푧푠−1, 푧푠+1, . . . , 푧푆) is a vector of market fundamentals in all states but
state 푠. This feasibility condition holds for every state 푠 and every island 푧푠. Similarly, the
feasibility or market-clearing constraint for a security paying in good-2 is given by∑
ℎ
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z−푠,Δ)
훼ℎ푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z−푠, 푧푠,Δ
)
휃푠 = 0 , ∀푠, 푧푠 (26)
Similar to the economy without lotteries, the market fundamental in each island must
be consistent. In other words, the planner will choose the composition of agents to set
the market fundamental for each island to its speciﬁed level. With identical homothetic
preferences, the consistency constraint for an island-푧푠 is that the aggregate ratio of good-1
to good-2 within the island-푧푠 be exactly 푧푠:
푧푠 =
∑
ℎ
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z−푠,Δ) 훼
ℎ푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z−푠, 푧푠,Δ
)(
푒ℎ1푠 + 휃ˆ푠
)
∑
ℎ
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z−푠,Δ) 훼
ℎ푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z−푠, 푧푠,Δ
) (
푒ℎ2푠 +푅푠푘 + 휃푠
) (27)
Using the feasibility conditions for securities within each island, (25)-(26) and the deﬁnition
of “type ℎ deviation from the fundamental” (18), these consistency constraints can be
rewritten as
∑
ℎ
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z−푠,Δ)
훼ℎ푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z−푠, 푧푠,Δ
)
Δ푠 = 0, ∀푠, 푧푠 (28)
where the last equation follows the deﬁnition of Δ푠.
Deﬁnition 4. An allocation x ≡ (xℎ)퐻
ℎ=1
∈ 푋1 × . . . × 푋퐻 is said to be attainable if
xℎ ∈ 푋ℎ for every ℎ, and it satisﬁes (23)-(26) and (28).
Let 푋 denote the set of all attainable allocations. With ﬁnite linear weak-inequality
constraints, the attainable set 푋 is compact and convex. In addition, the assumption that
the endowment is on the grids also ensures that 푋 is nonempty.
4.3. Constrained Optimal Allocations
A constrained optimal allocation is an attainable allocation such that there is no other
attainable allocation that can make at least one agent type strictly better oﬀ without
making any other agent type worse oﬀ. To be precise, the expected utility of an agent type
ℎ, holding a lottery xℎ, is given by
U ℎ
(
xℎ
)
=
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
){
푈
(
푐10, 푐20
)
+ 훽푉 ℎ
(
푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z
)}
where 푉 ℎ
(
푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z
)
=
∑
푠 휋푠푈
(
푒ℎ1푠 + 휃ˆ푠, 푒
ℎ
2푠 +푅푠푘 + 휃푠
)
is the “indirect” utility of agent
ℎ that is derived from a bundle
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
. This indirect utility is the result of the
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assignment of the bundle that is executed in period-1 over state 푠. In other words, it
summarizes all actions happening to the holder of the bundle in period-1. In each state 푠,
a holder type ℎ receives 휃ˆ푠 units of good-1 as the net-payment from portfolio 휃ˆ, 휃푠 units of
good-2 as the net-payment from portfolio 휃, 푅푠푘 units of good-2 from the collateral good,
and also 푒ℎ1푠 units of good-1 and 푒
ℎ
2푠 units of good-2 as endowments.
Deﬁnition 5. An attainable allocation x∗ ∈ 푋 is said to be a constrained optimal allocation
if there is no another attainable allocation x ∈ 푋 such that
U ℎ
(
xℎ
)
≥ U ℎ
(
x∗ℎ
)
for every ℎ, and U ℎ¯
(
xℎ¯
)
> U ℎ¯
(
x∗ℎ¯
)
for some ℎ¯
We characterize constrained optimality using the following Pareto program. Let 휆ℎ ≥ 0
be the Pareto weight of agent type ℎ. There is no loss of generality to normalize the weights
such that
∑
ℎ 휆
ℎ = 1. A constrained Pareto optimal allocation x∗ solves the following Pareto
program.
Deﬁnition 6. The Pareto Program with Lotteries:
max
(xℎ∈푋ℎ)
ℎ
∑
ℎ
휆ℎ훼ℎ
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
푥ℎ (푏)
{
푈ℎ
(
푐10, 푐20
)
+ 훽푉 ℎ
(
푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z
)}
(29)
subject to (23)-(26), (28).
Note again that we already embedded the collateral constraints (20) and the “individual
deviations from the fundamental” (18) into the consumption possibility sets 푋ℎ.
It is clear that the objective function now is linear in 푥ℎ. Thereby it is continuous and
weakly concave. As discussed earlier, the feasible set 푋 is non-empty, compact, and convex.
Therefore, a solution to the Pareto program for given positive Pareto weights exists and is
a global maximum. The proof of the equivalence between Pareto optimal allocations and
the solutions to the program is omitted for brevity (see Prescott and Townsend, 1984b, for
a similar proof).
5. Decentralized Equilibrium
Let 푃20 be the price of good-2 in period-0, and 푃
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
be the price of a
bundle
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
. Note that the price of good-1 in period-0 is 푃10 = 1 as good-1 is
the numeraire good. Each agent is inﬁnitesimally small relative to the entire economy and
will take all prices as given. The broker-dealers introduced below will also act competitively.
Note as well that Δ is also priced.
Consumers: Each agent ℎ, taking prices, 푃20, 푃
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
, as given, chooses
xℎ in period 푡 = 0 to maximize its expected utility:
max
xℎ
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
){
푈
(
푐10, 푐20
)
+ 훽푉 ℎ
(
푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z
)}
(30)
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subject to xℎ ∈ 푋ℎ, and period-0 budget constraint
푒ℎ10 + 푃20푒
ℎ
20 ≥
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
푃
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
(31)
The period-0 budget constraint (31) states that the agent sells all her endowments7 including
good-2 at price 푃20 and uses this income to buy lotteries x
ℎ, which includes consumption
in period-0,
(
푐ℎ10, 푐
ℎ
20
)
.
In state-푠, a type-ℎ holder of bundle
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
receives in addition to her endow-
ments of good-1 and good-2,
(
푒ℎ1푠, 푒
ℎ
2푠
)
, 휃ˆ푠 units of good-1 as the net-payment of portfolio
휃ˆ, 푅푠푘 units of good-2 from the collateral good, 휃푠 units of good-2 as the net-payment of
portfolio 휃. Of course, if 휃ˆ푠 and 휃푠 are negative, these are promise to pay. Again, the result
of the actions in period-1 is summarized in 푉 ℎ
(
푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z
)
. It is worthy of emphasis that
the agent will reside in island 푧푠, where she can in principle trade good-1 and good-2 at
price 푝(푧푠) in spot markets. (Again in the equilibrium under consideration it will not be
necessary to trade even though they believe they could.)
Broker-Dealers: The primary role of a broker-dealer is to put together deals, i.e.,
buying consumption goods and collateral and selling the bundle, including securities backed
by collateral. In order to do so, the broker-dealer issues (sells) 푦 (푏) ∈ R+ units of each
bundle 푏 =
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
, at the unit price 푃 (푏). Note that the broker-dealer can issue
any non-negative number of a bundle 푏; that is, the number of bundles issued does not have
to be between zero and one and is not a lottery. It is simply the number of bundles, a real
number. Let y ∈ 퐿 be the vector of the number of bundles issued as one move across 푏.
With constant returns to scale, the proﬁt of a broker-dealer must be zero and the number
of broker-dealers becomes irrelevant. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume there
is one representative broker-dealer, which takes prices as given.
By issuing or selling bundle 푏 =
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
, the broker-dealer promises to deliver
푘 units of collateral good to a holder, i.e., provide collateral to back promises. In order to
do so, the broker-dealer needs to acquire a suﬃcient amount of collateral. In particular,
it buys 퐼 units of good-2 at price 푃20 (in terms of good-1) in period-0, and distributes it
according to y. ∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
푦
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
푘 = 퐼 (32)
This constraint states that the broker-dealer uses 퐼 as collateral for the promises to deliver
the collateral good.
Similarly, the broker-dealer will also deliver (푐10, 푐20) units of good-1 and good-2 to a
holder of a bundle 푏 =
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
. In order to do so, the broker-dealer acquires 퐶1
7It is worthy of emphasis that we can write an equivalent problem specifying consumption transfers in
period-0, instead of consumption allocation. By doing so, agents do not need to sell their entire endowments
but simply buy and sell consumption transfers. In other words, it is not restrictive that we make agents sell
their entire endowments and buy consumption allocation through lotteries.
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units of good-1 and 퐶2 units of good-2, and distributes them according to y:∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
푦
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
푐10 = 퐶1 (33)
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
푦
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
푐20 = 퐶2 (34)
In conclusion, the total (market) cost to the broker-dealer from buying good-1 and good-2
for collateral backing and consumption is equal to 퐶1 + 푃20퐶2 + 푃20퐼.
Furthermore, it also delivers or assigns a portfolio of claims or securities
(
휃ˆ, 휃
)
to the
holder. We do not require the broker-dealer to oﬀer collateral backing for securities de-
livered to consumers, 휃ˆ, 휃 < 0, and done with collateral 푘 as that is up to the consumers
themselves. Neither does the broker-dealer itself hold any securities or net position, but
simply distributes securities according to y. Hence, the net-supply of each contract from
the broker-dealer must be zero:∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z−푠,Δ)
푦
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z−푠, 푧푠,Δ
)
휃ˆ푠 = 0, ∀푠, 푧푠 (35)
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z−푠,Δ)
푦
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z−푠, 푧푠,Δ
)
휃푠 = 0, ∀푠, 푧푠 (36)
As we shall see below, these constraints will be equivalent to the market-clearing constraints
for contracts in the competitive equilibrium with 푦
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
=
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
,
essential the market-clearing condition for lotteries.
The broker-dealer’s technology also requires that the sum of all “type ℎ deviations from
the fundamental” must be zero in each island-푧푠 for every state 푠:
∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z−푠,Δ)
푦
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z−푠, 푧푠,Δ
)
Δ푠 = 0 , ∀푠, 푧푠 (37)
This constraint is the counter part of the consistency constraint (28) in the Pareto program.
In particular, using the market-clearing condition for lotteries, we can show that this con-
sistency constraint is identical to (28). Hence, it is also called the consistency constraint
for an island-푧푠 for every state 푠.
The objective of the broker-dealer is to maximize its proﬁt by choosing (y, 퐶1, 퐶2, 퐼),
taking prices, 푃20, 푃
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
, as given:
max
(y,퐶1,퐶2,퐼)
∑
푏
푦 (푏)푃 (푏)−
[
퐶1 + 푃20퐶2 + 푃20퐼
]
(38)
s.t. (32)− (37)
where the ﬁrst term is the total revenue of the broker-dealer and the bracketed term denotes
its total (market) cost.
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The existence of an optimum to the broker-dealer’s problem requires, that for any bundle(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
,
푃
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
≤ 푐10 + 푃20푐20 + 푃20푘 + 푃ˆ푎(z) ⋅ 휃ˆ + 푃푎(z) ⋅ 휃 + 푃Δ(z) ⋅Δ (39)
where 푃ˆ푎 (z) ≡
(
푃ˆ푎(푧푠, 푠)
)푆
푠=1
, 푃푎 (z) ≡ (푃푎(푧푠, 푠))푆푠=1 , and 푃Δ (z) ≡ (푃Δ(푧푠, 푠))푆푠=1 are the
vectors of Lagrange multipliers for the market-clearing constraints for contracts paying in
good-1 (35), for the market-clearing constraints for contracts paying in good-2 (36), and for
consistency constraints (37), respectively. In particular, for an island 푧푠 in state 푠, 푃ˆ푎(푧푠, 푠),
푃푎(푧푠, 푠), and 푃Δ(푧푠, 푠) are the shadow prices of a contract paying in good-1 and good-2,
respectively, and the shadow price of “type ℎ deviations from the fundamental” in the island-
푧푠. Condition (39) holds with equality if 푦
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
> 0. Here 푃
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
is the revenue from the sale of one unit of bundle
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
. This condition is in fact
the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the saddle-point proﬁt maximization problem.
Deﬁne 푐10 + 푃20푐20 + 푃20푘 as the market cost of the bundle, and 푃ˆ푎(z) ⋅ 휃ˆ + 푃푎(z) ⋅ 휃 +
푃Δ(z) ⋅Δ as its shadow cost. The broker-dealer considers the sum of both market cost and
shadow cost as its total cost for issuing a bundle. The optimal condition (39) states that
the broker-dealer will issue a bundle only if it does not cause a total loss (the revenue is
strictly less than the sum of market cost and shadow cost). On the other hand, the revenue
of a bundle cannot be strictly larger than the total cost. Otherwise, the broker-dealer will
issue an unbounded number of such a bundle, which cannot be an equilibrium. In addition,
the total market proﬁt of the broker-dealer in equilibrium is zero.
Market Clearing: In period-0, the market-clearing condition for good-1 is∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
푦
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
푐10 =
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ푒ℎ10 (40)
Similarly, the market-clearing condition for good-2 in period-0 is∑
(c0,푘,휃ˆ,휃,z,Δ)
푦
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
[푐20 + 푘] =
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ푒ℎ20 (41)
The market-clearing conditions for lotteries in period-0 are∑
ℎ
훼ℎ푥ℎ
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
= 푦
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
, ∀
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
(42)
Deﬁnition 7. A competitive equilibrium is a speciﬁcation of allocation (x,y), and the
prices 푃20, 푃
(
c0, 푘, 휃ˆ, 휃, z,Δ
)
such that
(i) for each ℎ, xℎ ∈ 푋ℎ solves (30) subject to (31), taking prices as given,
(ii) for the broker-dealer,
{
y, 푃ˆ푎(z), 푃푎(z), 푃Δ(z)
}
solves (38), taking prices as given,
(iii) in period-0, markets for good-1, good-2 and lotteries clear, i.e., (40)-(42) hold,
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6. Existence and Welfare Theorems
As in the classical general equilibrium model, the economy is a well-deﬁned convex
economy, i.e., the commodity space is Euclidean, the consumption set is compact and
convex, the utility function is linear. As a result, the ﬁrst and second welfare theorems hold,
and a competitive equilibrium exists. In particular, this section proves that the competitive
equilibrium is constrained optimal and any constrained optimal allocation can be supported
by a competitive equilibrium with transfers. Then, we will use Negishi’s method to prove
the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Since all the proofs in this section are quite
standard, we put them in the supplementary materials.
The standard contradiction argument will be used to prove the following ﬁrst welfare
theorem. We also assume that there is no local satiation point in the consumption set.
Assumption 2. For any xℎ ∈ 푋ℎ, there exists x˜ℎ ∈ 푋ℎ such that
U ℎ
(
x˜ℎ
)
> U ℎ
(
xℎ
)
(43)
where U ℎ
(
xℎ
)
is the expected utility of agent ℎ derived from allocation xℎ.
This assumption is easily satisﬁed using reasonable speciﬁcations of the grid of consumption
allocation in period-0. For example, with a strictly increasing utility function, if we include
a very large consumption allocation in period-0 into the grid (larger than what can be
attained with endowments and storage), then the local nonsatiation assumption will be
satisﬁed.
Theorem 6.1. With local nonsatiation of preferences (Assumption 2), a competitive equi-
librium allocation is (constrained) Pareto optimal.
The Second Welfare theorem states that any Pareto optimal allocation, corresponding
to strictly positive Pareto weights, can be supported as a competitive equilibrium with
transfers, precisely deﬁned in the supplementary materials. The standard approach applies
here. In particular, we will ﬁrst prove that any constrained optimal allocation can be decen-
tralized as a compensated equilibrium (precisely deﬁned in the supplementary materials).
Then, we will use a standard cheaper-point argument (see Debreu, 1954) to show that any
compensated equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium with transfers.
Theorem 6.2. With Assumption 1, any Pareto optimal allocation corresponding with
strictly positive Pareto weights 휆ℎ > 0,∀ℎ can be supported as a competitive equilibrium
with transfers.
We will use Negishi’s mapping method (Negishi, 1960) to prove the existence of com-
petitive equilibrium. The proof beneﬁts from the second welfare theorem. Speciﬁcally, a
part of the mapping applies the theorem in that the solution to the Pareto program is a
competitive equilibrium with transfers. We will show that a ﬁxed-point of the mapping
exists and it represents a competitive equilibrium without transfers.
Theorem 6.3. For any positive endowments, with Assumption 1, a competitive equilibrium
exists.
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7. Details of the Building Blocks: Asset-Backed Securities, Collateral Con-
straints, and Spot Markets
This section precisely deﬁnes asset-back securities (pyramiding), and derives the uniﬁed
collateral constraints (4) by considering the collateral constraints of each type of securities
one at a time and adding them up (and disaggregating back down). In addition, we also
prove that the spot markets are equivalent to ex-ante asset-backed securities.
7.1. Collateral Constraints on Directly Collateralized Securities
To generalize a bit, let 휓ˆℎ ≡ (휓ˆℎ푠 )푆푠=1 ∈ R푆 and 휓ℎ ≡ (휓ℎ푠 )푆푠=1 ∈ R푆 denote agent ℎ’s
portfolios of securities demanded, held at the end of period-0 paying in good-1 and in good-
2, both with good-2 as collateral directly, respectively. Again, we adopt the convention that
positive means demand and negative means sale. So, holding a positive amount of a security
paying good 2 in state 푠, 푚푎푥
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)
= 휓ℎ푠 , a positive number, is equivalent to buying that
security (or lending) while holding a negative amount of a security, 푚푖푛
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)
= 휓ℎ푠 , a
negative number, is equivalent to selling that security (or borrowing). In short, the max
and min operators pick oﬀ demand and supply, respectively. A wedge is created by the need
to back the supply by collateral but not the demand.
More generally, a security paying a unit of good-1 in state 푠 backed by good-2 pays the
minimum of 1 unit of good-1 or the value of its collateral in state 푠. By an argument similar
to the one given earlier, the minimum no-default collateral is 1푝(푧푠)푅푠 per unit. Similarly,
with no-default and no-over-collateralization, a security paying in good-2 in state 푠 requires
1
푅푠
units of good-2 as collateral. The results so far are summarized in the ﬁrst two rows of
the Table 1 with collateral requirement in the last column.
Table 1: Collateral requirements for each type of securities.
payment collateral issued purchased assets total collateral
unit unit liabilities available requirement for
as collateral no default securities
휓ˆℎ푠 good-1 good-2 −min
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
max
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
−
(
1
푅푠푝(푧푠)
)
min
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
휓ℎ푠 good-2 good-2 −min
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)
max
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
) −( 1푅푠)min (0, 휓ℎ푠 )
휎ˆℎ푠 good-1 securities paying −min
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
max
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
) −( 1푝(푧푠))min (0, 휎ˆℎ푠 )
in good-2
휎ℎ푠 good-2 securities paying −min
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
max
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
) −푝(푧푠) min (0, 휎ℎ푠 )
in good-1
휈ˆℎ푠 good-1 securities paying −min
(
0, 휈ˆℎ푠
)
max
(
0, 휈ˆℎ푠
) −min (0, 휈ˆℎ푠 )
in good-1
휈ℎ푠 good-2 securities paying −min
(
0, 휈ℎ푠
)
max
(
0, 휈ℎ푠
) −min (0, 휈ℎ푠 )
in good-2
For securities
(
휓ˆℎ푠 , 휓
ℎ
푠
)
with good-2 as collateral, paying in good-1 and good-2, re-
spectively, agent ℎ must hold good-2 at the end of period-0 no less than the collateral
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requirement in any state (shown in Table 1):
푘ℎ ≥ −min
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)( 1
푅푠푝(푧푠)
)
−min
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)( 1
푅푠
)
, ∀푠 (44)
which can be rewritten as
푝(푧푠)푅푠푘
ℎ + min
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
+ 푝(푧푠) min
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)
≥ 0, ∀푠 (45)
These are state-contingent collateral requirement constraints with directly collateralized
contracts. We incorporate asset-backed securities in the next section.
Note that when an agent ℎ’s collateral requirement constraints (44) are not binding for
every state 푠 (i.e., the LHS of (44) exceeds its RHS or (44) holds with strict inequality
for every state 푠), then the agent ℎ holds collateral 푘ℎ more than needed to back issued
securities. The extra part of collateral is normal saving.
7.2. Pyramiding: Asset-Backed Securities
In real world economies, agents are allowed to use the promises to receive goods of others
as collateral to back their own promises. This is termed pyramiding. In other words, there
are two types of collateral, good-2 itself (described in the preceding section) and “assets”
backed by such collateral. The prototypical example of an asset-backed promise in this
paper is an ex-ante agreement for an agent to give up good-1 in the spot market in state 푠
backed by someone else’s promise, a receipt of good-2, or vice versa. The promise of receipt
is the asset, and this backs the promise to pay. Indeed, if the planned spot-market trade
is at equilibrium price of 푝(푧푠), then one is moving along a budget line and so the value
of collateral, the good to be recovered, exactly equals the promise and there is no need for
additional underlying collateral.
With two physical commodities, there are four possible types of asset-backed securities,
summarized in the last four rows of Table 1. For example, a unit of an asset-backed
security 휎ˆ푠 paying in good-1 in state 푠 needs
1
푝(푧푠)
units of assets paying in good-2 as
collateral. The value of the payoﬀ of 1푝(푧푠) units of securities paying in good-2 in state 푠
equals 푝(푧푠)× 1푝(푧푠) = 1 unit of good-1, which is exactly the face-value promise to pay. These
collateral requirements are minimum no-default levels.
As shown in the third row of Table 1 (see the column titled total collateral requirement),
an asset-backed security paying a unit of good-1 in state 푠, 휎ˆℎ푠 , requires that the total
amount of purchased assets paying in good-2 in state 푠 is no less than −
(
1
푝(푧푠)
)
min
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
.
Similarly, an asset-backed security 휈ℎ푠 requires that the total amount of purchased assets
paying in good-2 in state 푠 is no less than −min (0, 휈ℎ푠 ) (see the last row of Table 1). On
the other hand, the total amount of purchased assets paying in good-2 is max
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)
+
max
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
+ max
(
0, 휈ℎ푠
)
, as shown in the second, fourth and last rows of Table 1 (see the
next-to-last column titled purchased assets). Hence, the collateral requirement condition
regarding issued securities 휎ˆℎ푠 and 휈
ℎ
푠 that require ﬁnancial assets paying in good 2 as
collateral can be written as, for any state 푠,
max
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)
+ max
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
+ max
(
0, 휈ℎ푠
)
≥ −
(
1
푝(푧푠)
)
min
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
−min
(
0, 휈ℎ푠
)
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This states that the agent purchases enough assets or promises paying in good-2, 휃ℎ푠 , 휎
ℎ
푠 , 휈
ℎ
푠 ,
to back up her own asset-backed securities or issued promises 휎ˆℎ푠 , 휈
ℎ
푠 . The above condition
can be rearranged as
푝(푧푠) max
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)
+ 푝(푧푠) max
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
+ 푝(푧푠)휈
ℎ
푠 ≥ −min
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
(46)
where we applies the fact that max
(
0, 휈ℎ푠
)
+ min
(
0, 휈ℎ푠
)
= 휈ℎ푠 .
Similarly, the collateral requirement condition for issued securities that require ﬁnancial
assets paying in good 1 as collateral is given by
max
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
+ max
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
+ 휈ˆℎ푠 ≥ −푝(푧푠) min
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
, ∀푠 (47)
where the right-hand-side comes from the fourth and ﬁfth rows of Table 1.
7.3. The Derivation of The Collateral Constraints
We now show that the collateral constraints (4) are equivalent to collateral requirement
conditions (with three types of collateral), (45), (46), and (47). In other words, there is no
loss of generality to use the collateral constraints (4); an allocation is attainable under (4)
if and only if it is so under (45), (46), and (47).
To be more precise, let 휃ˆℎ푠 = 휓ˆ
ℎ
푠 + 휎ˆ
ℎ
푠 + 휈ˆ
ℎ
푠 and 휃
ℎ
푠 = 휓
ℎ
푠 + 휎
ℎ
푠 + 휈
ℎ
푠 be state-푠 contingent
securities paying in good-1 and in good-2, respectively, which can be backed either by good-
2 or purchased assets (other people’s promises). Note that 휃ˆℎ푠 and 휃
ℎ
푠 include both directly
collateralized and asset-backed securities. An attainable allocation under (45), (46), and
(47) can be deﬁned similarly to the one under (4) by replacing (10)-(11) the following
resource constraints:∑
ℎ
훼ℎ휓ˆℎ푠 =
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ휓ℎ푠 =
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ휎ˆℎ푠 =
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ휎ℎ푠 =
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ휈ˆℎ푠 =
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ휈ℎ푠 = 0, ∀푠 (48)
The collateral constraint (4) results from summing (45), (46), and (47) altogether, and
then applying max(0, 푥) + min(0, 푥) = 푥 to get rid of max and min operators. In addi-
tion, the proof of this lemma in Appendix A also shows how to recover contract allocation(
휓ˆℎ푠 , 휓
ℎ
푠 , 휎ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휎
ℎ
푠 , 휈ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휈
ℎ
푠
)
ℎ
from
(
휃ˆℎ푠 , 휃
ℎ
푠
)
.
Lemma 4. The following statements are true:
(i) if
(
cℎ0 , 푘
ℎ, 휓ˆℎ푠 , 휓
ℎ
푠 , 휎ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휎
ℎ
푠 , 휈ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휈
ℎ
푠
)
ℎ
is attainable, then the collateral constraint (4) and
the market-clearing conditions (10)-(11) hold, and
(ii) if
(
푘ℎ, 휃ˆℎ푠 , 휃
ℎ
푠
)
ℎ
is attainable, then there exists a collateral and security allocation(
푘ℎ, 휓ˆℎ푠 , 휓
ℎ
푠 , 휎ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휎
ℎ
푠 , 휈ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휈
ℎ
푠
)
ℎ
that satisﬁes collateral requirement conditions (45), (46),
(47) and the market-clearing conditions (48).
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7.4. Ex-ante Contracting versus Ex-post Spot Trading
Thus far we implicitly shut down trade in the spot markets in each state. This section
shows that the spot markets are redundant when all types of contracts are available (see
Lemma 5 below). In other words, agents do not need to trade in spot markets, though
they may well do so. Importantly, the spot markets are open and deliver the spot price
푝(푧푠). In addition, we also show that the asset-backed securities are not necessary when the
spot markets are open and active (see Lemma 6 below). Put diﬀerently, agents simply are
indiﬀerent between trading in spot markets or ex-ante asset-backed securities. The proofs
are similar to the proof of Lemma 4, and therefore they are put in the supplementary.
When the spot markets are open, each agent ℎ can trade 휏ˆℎ푠 units of good 1 for 휏
ℎ
푠 units
of good 2 at a spot price 푝(푧푠) according to the spot-trade constraint:
휏ˆℎ푠 + 푝(푧푠)휏
ℎ
푠 = 0 (49)
Recall that the spot price function, 푝(푧푠), is the price such that the spot markets for both
goods clear: ∑
ℎ
훼ℎ휏ˆℎ푠 = 0 (50)∑
ℎ
훼ℎ휏ℎ푠 = 0 (51)
Hence, an attainable allocation with the spot markets is deﬁned by adding the spot-trade
constraint (49) and market-clearing constraints (50)-(51) to Deﬁnition 1.
To be more precise, an allocation is said to be equivalent to an attainable allocation if
it is attainable and generates the same consumption allocation and market fundamental in
each state 푠 as the original attainable allocation.
Lemma 5. For any attainable allocation
(
cℎ0 , 푘
ℎ, 휃ˆℎ, 휃ℎ, 휏ˆℎ, 휏ℎ
)
ℎ
, there exists an equiva-
lent allocation
(
cℎ0 , 푘
ℎ, 휃ˆ′ℎ, 휃′ℎ, 휏ˆ ′ℎ, 휏 ′ℎ
)
ℎ
such that
휏ˆ ′ℎ푠 = 휏
′ℎ
푠 = 0,∀푠, ℎ (52)
Condition (52) in Lemma 5 implies that the spot markets in period-1 are redundant
when all securities are allowed; that is, anything that can be done through the spot markets
and one set of securities is feasible under another set of securities without spot markets.
Henceforth (and previously), the ex-post spot trade transfers will be (were) set to zero,
(휏ˆℎ = 0, 휏ℎ = 0 as in (52)) and the spot-trade constraints (49) will be (were) neglected,
unless stated otherwise.
Lemma 6. For any attainable allocation
(
cℎ0 , 푘
ℎ, 휓ˆℎ푠 , 휓
ℎ
푠 , 휎ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휎
ℎ
푠 , 휈ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휈
ℎ
푠 , 휏ˆ
ℎ, 휏ℎ
)
ℎ
, there exists
an equivalent allocation
(
cℎ0 , 푘
ℎ, 휓ˆ′ℎ푠 , 휓′ℎ푠 , 휎ˆ′ℎ푠 , 휎′ℎ푠 , 휈ˆ ′ℎ푠 , 휈 ′ℎ푠 , 휏ˆ ′ℎ, 휏 ′ℎ
)
ℎ
such that
휎ˆ′ℎ푠 = 휎
′ℎ
푠 = 휈ˆ
′ℎ
푠 = 휈
′ℎ
푠 = 0, ∀푠, ℎ (53)
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It is worthy of emphasis that Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 imply that the asset-backed
securities that we need in this model are the ones that replicate spot markets. In other
words, the asset-backed securities in this model (with tranching) are simply substitutes for
spot markets. Henceforth, we let asset-backed securities play this role and shut down active
trade in spot markets. The result is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Asset-backed securities and the spot markets are perfect substitute in this
model.
8. Analysis of Prices
This section characterizes systematic relationships among equilibrium prices.
8.1. Spot Markets and Contract Prices: No-Arbitrage Condition
The pyramiding mechanism puts a restriction on the prices of contracts traded within
each price-island. The ratio of the equilibrium prices of the securities in island-푧푠 in state 푠,
푃푎(푧푠,푠)
푃ˆ푎(푧푠,푠)
, must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution or the spot price in the island,
푝(푧푠). Otherwise, there will be an arbitrage possibility (by keeping the collateral constraints
satisﬁed with pyramiding). The result is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 7. In a competitive equilibrium, for each 푠 and 푧푠,
푃푎(푧푠, 푠) = 푝(푧푠)푃ˆ푎(푧푠, 푠) (54)
Using the no-arbitrage condition (54), the collateral constraints (4) can be rewritten as
푃 (푧푠, 푠)푅푠푘 ≥ −푃ˆ푎(푧푠, 푠)휃ˆ푠 − 푃 (푧푠, 푠) 휃푠, ∀푠 (55)
These constraints state that the value in units of good 1 at 푡 = 0 of all ex ante securities held
(RHS) cannot exceed the value of collateral held (LHS). These constraints are applicable
when the spot markets are not available but the ex-ante asset-backed securities can be
traded.
8.2. Prices of the Right to Trade
Trading in price islands also imposes a restriction on collateral, contract and price-island
prices, 푃20, 푃푎(푧푠, 푠), 푃Δ(푧푠, 푠). Even though collateral and securities are indeterminate (see
Lemma 11 in the supplementary), holding collateral additionally impacts the spot price
푝(푧푠). Therefore, the equilibrium price of collateral must reﬂect the role of collateral on the
spot price in each price island.
Again a no-arbitrage condition requires that the prices of two diﬀerent bundles that
result in the same consumption allocation for an agent ℎ must have the same prices. Using
the proﬁt maximization condition of a broker-dealer (39) and some algebra, we can prove
the following equation must hold.
푃20 +
푆∑
푠=1
푃Δ (푧푠, 푠) 푧푠푅푠 =
푆∑
푠=1
푃푎 (푧푠, 푠)푅푠 (56)
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The RHS is the price of contracts paying 푅푠 units of good-2 in every state 푠. On the other
hand, the LHS is the total cost of the same return, received by buying and holding a unit
of collateral. The ﬁrst term on the LHS is the price of the collateral good. The second term
on the LHS comes from the fact that holding more a unit of good-2 increases Δ in every
state 푠 by the amount 푧푠푅푠. In particular, an agent holding an additional unit of collateral
must pay for the marginal impact 푧푠푅푠 at price 푃Δ (푧푠, 푠). This term prices the impact of
collateral on the market fundamental. In equilibrium, these two values must be the same.
Lemma 8. In a competitive equilibrium, for each set of islands z = (푧푠)푠, (56) holds.
8.3. Trading in Price-Islands Generates Intertemporal Transfers
Trading in price-islands can generate additional intertemporal transfers. For example,
a constrained agent would like to smooth consumption by issuing securities or borrowing to
transfer future resources back to period-0 but cannot do so much because of the limited com-
mitment. Trading in price-islands facilitates more consumption smoothing by generating
period-0 transfer for a constrained agent.
For the sake of discussion, we will consider a case with two types of agents one of which
is constrained, and without uncertainty (i.e., 푆 = 1). In addition, as shown in the previous
section, we assume that a constrained agent holds no collateral, 푘 = 0. Using (18), (39),
and (54), an agent type ℎ’s budget constraint (31) can be rewritten as∑
푏
푥ℎ (푏) [푐10 + 푃20푐20] ≤ 푒ℎ10 + 푃20푒ℎ20 +
∑
푏
푥ℎ (푏) 푃ˆ푎 (푧1, 1)
[
−휃ˆ1 − 푝(푧1)휃1
]
+
∑
푏
푥ℎ (푏)푃Δ (푧1, 1)
[
푒ℎ11
푒ℎ21
− 푧1
]
푒ℎ21
The third term on the RHS is the revenue from borrowing via
(
휃ˆ1, 휃1
)
. Using the
collateral constraint (20), 푝(푧1)푅1푘 + 휃ˆ1 + 푝(푧1)휃1 ≥ 0. Since the constrained agent holds
no collateral, 푘 = 0, her collateral constraint becomes 휃ˆ1 + 푝(푧1)휃1 = 0. Of course, this
constrained agent would like to go short on the contracts (i.e., having 휃ˆ1 + 푝(푧1)휃1 < 0) but
cannot do so because she holds no collateral. In other words, with zero collateral, the agent
cannot borrow from trading in contracts.
Of special interest, the last term on the RHS shows that the constrained agent could
potentially receive positive period-0 wealth by trading in price-islands. In particular, a
constrained agent could smooth consumption intertemporally by trading in price-islands
in such a way that this term is positive, giving her more resources to purchase date zero
consumption. For example, if 푃Δ (푧푠, 푠) > 0, then the constrained agent will buy a price
island-푧푠 whose market fundamental is lower than her own endowment, i.e., 푧푠 <
푒ℎ1푠
푒ℎ2푠
, and
vice versa (see also Examples in the next section).
On the other hand, an unconstrained agent will potentially hold strictly positive amount
of collateral, 푘 > 0. She will in fact transfer out period-0 wealth from trading in price-
islands. For example, if a constrained agent has 푧푠 <
푒ℎ1푠
푒ℎ2푠
, then the consistency constraint
(28) implies that an unconstrained agent in island-푧푠 must have 푧푠 >
푒ℎ1푠
푅푠푘+푒ℎ2푠
. Hence, if
푃Δ (푧푠, 푠) > 0, the last term on the RHS will be negative for an unconstrained agent.
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9. Numerical Examples
Two economies without uncertainty and one economy with uncertainty are discussed in
this section. As formally shown in Lemma 11 in the supplementary, all equilibria presented
here have constrained agents holding zero collateral, 푘 = 0. For brevity, several details are
omitted but available in the supplementary.
The ﬁrst economy consists of two types of agents. A collateral equilibrium with an
externality and a competitive equilibrium with price-islands (without externality) are both
presented. We ﬁnd naturally that the externality leads to a larger amount of aggregate sav-
ing (over all collateral) relative to the one in the competitive equilibrium with price-islands
or segregated exchanges. Interestingly, the competitive equilibrium with price-islands has
a unique active price-island even though all price-islands are available. This does not have
to be true in general, however. In particular, the second environment with three types of
agents illustrates a price-islands equilibrium with multiple active price-islands.
The eﬀects of internalizing the externality on prices and allocations are discussed. We
ﬁnd that internalizing the externality could make (i) the price of good-2 ﬂuctuates less over
time relative to the collateral equilibrium, and (ii) someone is strictly better oﬀ and someone
is strictly worse oﬀ than being in the collateral equilibrium. The ﬁrst outcome suggests,
again naturally enough, that the externality causes the collateral price to ﬂuctuate too much.
It is the good in short supply when there are borrowing constrained agents. The second
outcome is a bit more surprising; trading in the price islands may generate a redistribution
of wealth across agents. This is a general equilibrium eﬀect of the model. See ﬁgure 3.
Note that, as shown in example 3, the second statement may not be true in general. The
redistribution of wealth could be very small or vanishing when the agents are quite similar.
If so, internalizing the externality would lead to a Pareto improvement.
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Figure 3: Bold curve: the Pareto frontier and collateral equilibrium without lotteries; Dash curve: the Pareto
frontier and competitive equilibrium with lotteries.
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Environment 1. There is a single state, 푆 = 1, and two types of agents, 퐻 = 2, both of
which have an identical constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function
푈(푐1, 푐2) =
푐1−훾1
1− 훾 +
푐1−훾2
1− 훾 , ∀ℎ (57)
where 훾 = 2. Each type consists of 12 fraction of the population, i.e. 훼
ℎ = 12 . In addition,
the discount factor 훽 = 1. The storage technology is given by 푅 = 1. The endowment
proﬁles of the agents are shown in Table 2 below. Recall that 푒ℎ푖푡 is an agent ℎ’s endowment
of good-푖 in period 푡. Note that endowments for both agents are symmetric. In particular,
an agent type 1 is well endowed with both goods in period-0 and vice versa for type 2.
Table 2: Endowment proﬁles of the agents.
endowments ﬁrst-best allocations
푒ℎ10 푒
ℎ
20 푒
ℎ
11 푒
ℎ
21 푘
ℎ 푐ℎ10 푐
ℎ
20 푐
ℎ
11 푐
ℎ
21
ℎ = 1 3 3 1 1 0 2 2 2 2
ℎ = 2 1 1 3 3 0 2 2 2 2
The symmetry of endowments with 훽 = 1, and of the utility function across goods
implies that the ﬁrst-best aggregate saving will be zero, and each agent gets the average 2
units of each good in each period (see Table 2). Accordingly, the ﬁrst-best price of good-2
in period-0 is 푃 푓푏20 = 1, and the market fundamental is 푧 = 1. Unfortunately, the ﬁrst-best
allocation is not attainable; that is, it violates the collateral constraints.
We now consider the economy with default and collateral (with an externality). The
endowment proﬁle and the ﬁrst-best allocation suggest that agent 2 would like to move
resources forward from 푡 = 1 to 푡 = 0, and therefore will be constrained. Hence, we will
assume that agents type 2 hold no collateral, i.e. 푘1 = 푘 and 푘2 = 0. We will then solve for
an equilibrium 푘.
As shown in the supplementary materials, the equilibrium collateral is 푘 = 1.3595.
As a result, the price of good-2 in period 0 is 푃20 =
(
4
4−푘
)2
= 2.2948, and the market
fundamental in period-1 is 푧 = 44+푘 = 0.7463, which implies that the spot price is 푝(푧) =
푧훾 = 0.5570. Note that the collateral price at 푡 = 0 is higher in the equilibrium with an
externality, i.e., 푃 푓푏20 = 1 < 푃20 = 2.2948. On the other hand, the spot price of good-2 in
period-1 is lower in the equilibrium with an externality, i.e., 푝푓푏(푧) = 1 > 푝(푧) = 0.5570.
In words, the collateral distortion makes the price of good-2 higher in the ﬁrst period and
lower in the second period relative to the ﬁrst-best. Nevertheless, an agent type 1 is saving.
This is because saving is the only way she can transfer resources to 푡 = 1, given that a
constrained agent holds zero collateral and cannot trade intertemporally.
Figure 4a illustrates period-0 equilibrium allocation with the externality. It shows that
agent 1, the unconstrained agent, sells good 1 and buys good 2, and vice versa for agent
2. In addition, the allocation is on the budget line of constrained agent 2, which is the
line passing through 퐸20 . This implies that the unconstrained agent will eﬀectively do all
the saving, 푘1 = 1.3595. Figure 4b illustrates period-1 equilibrium allocation with the
externality, including security trades. Agent 1 buys 휃ˆ1 = 0.3252 and sells 휃1 = −0.5839,
and vice versa for agent 2. Equivalently, we can actually dispense with securities: agent 1
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buys 0.3252 units of good 1 and sells 0.5839 units of good 2 at price 푝(푧) = 0.5570 in spot
markets, and vice versa. In other words, all security trades are equivalent to spot trades.
In addition, the expected utility of an agent type 1 and type 2 are U 1 = −2.2527 and
U 2 = −2.5724, respectively. The unconstrained agent is better oﬀ.
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Figure 4: The equilibrium (with externality) allocation. (a) Point A is period-0 equilibrium allocation with
the externality where Agent 1 buys good-2, sells good-1, and saves good-2, and vice versa. (b) Point C is
the period-1 equilibrium allocation with the externality where agent 1 buys good-1 and sells good-2, and
vice versa.
We will now turn to a corresponding competitive equilibrium with price-islands. The
equilibrium allocation reported in this paper is a numerical solution to the Pareto program
(29) that corresponds to a competitive equilibrium (without transfers8).
There is only one active island, 푧 = 0.7729, even though all price-islands are available
for trade. We will now compare this equilibrium allocation without any externality to the
one with an externality. The equilibrium average or per capita saving (without externality)
is
∑
ℎ
∑
푏 훼
ℎ푥ℎ(푏)푘 = 1.17532 = 0.5877, which clearly smaller than the aggregate saving in
the equilibrium with externality, though more than the ﬁrst-best.
With lower aggregate saving, the price of good-2 in period 0 is lower (푃20 = 2.0073 <
2.2948) but the spot price of good 2 is higher (푝(푧) = 0.5974 > 0.5570), relative to the
one in the equilibrium with the externality. Thus, the price of good-2 varies less over time
when the externality is internalized. Equilibrium fees of price-islands, including the fees of
inactive (out-of equilibrium) islands are summarized in Table 3 below.
Notice that the fees of price islands are increasing with the market fundamentals; that
is, the larger the speciﬁed market fundamental of a price island, the higher the fee of the
8The linearity of the problem again can potentially generate multiple equilibria; that is, there can be
some conﬁgurations of Pareto weights that map a given endowment to diﬀerent competitive equilibria with
diﬀerent prices and allocations (see the Working Paper version of Prescott and Townsend, 2006, for a similar
discussion). In all of the examples, we search for a competitive equilibrium using Negishi’s mapping method.
The corresponding Pareto weight is 휆1 = 0.7780, 휆2 = 0.2220. It is computed using Matlab program on a
personal computer with AMD Athlon 64X2 Dual Core Processor 3800+ 2.01 GHz, 3.87 GB RAM.
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Table 3: Equilibrium fees of price-islands. The bold numbers are (actively traded) equilibrium prices.
푧 = 0.7479 z = 0.7729 푧 = 0.7979
푃Δ(푧) 0.4639 0.5375 0.6118
price island will be. Intuitively, the larger the market fundamental, the larger the price of
good 2 relative to good 1. Hence, an agent with a larger amount of good 2 relative to good
1 will beneﬁt more from being in a higher price island. Hence, it is optimal to require the
beneﬁciary agents to pay more for trading in a higher price island, as in the row 푃Δ(푧). Note
also that the prices of out-of-equilibrium (non-active) islands are set to make broker-dealers
break even, but at such prices consumers do not want to buy them.
Since the equilibrium fee 푃Δ(푧) = 0.5375 is positive in this example, agents with negative
deviation from the fundamental (agent 2 in this case) must get paid for the access to the price
island. In particular, a constrained agent (ℎ = 2) with Δ = −0.6813, is receiving transfer
−푃Δ(푧)Δ = 0.3662 in period 푡 = 0 for being in the equilibrium price-island. Graphically,
this shifts her budget line outward by 푇 = 0.3662. See ﬁgure 1a. This implies how trading
in price islands generates the redistribution of wealth in general equilibrium.
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Figure 5: The equilibrium (without the externality) allocation. (a) Point B is the period-0 equilibrium
allocation without the externality where Agent 1 receives wealth transfer, 푇 = 0.366, from trading in price-
islands. (b) Point D is the period-1 equilibrium allocation without the externality.
In addition, the expected utility of an agent type 1 and type 2 are U 1 = −2.2936,U 2 =
−2.3905, respectively. Recall that the expected utility in the externality equilibrium of an
agent type 1 and type 2 areU 1 = −2.2527 andU 2 = −2.5724, respectively. This shows that
internalizing the externality is beneﬁcial to an agent type 2 (constrained agent) but harmful
for an agent type 1. This is a (distributional) general equilibrium eﬀect. Internalizing the
externality not only improves eﬃciency of the economy, but also redistributes wealth. To
induce welfare gain for all of agents, there must be lump sum transfers. All agents are
beneﬁt from the eﬃciency eﬀect, which shifts the Pareto frontier outward as shown in
ﬁgure 3. Some agents may be harmed by the distributional eﬀect, however. Note also that
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similar to the collateral equilibrium, all security trades are equivalent to spot trades.
The next environment demonstrates that it is possible to have multiple active islands
or segregated exchanges. In particular, with three types of agents, two of which are con-
strained, there are two distinct active price islands in equilibrium, each of which consists of
diﬀerent composition of agents. Each island, in fact, consists of one constrained type and
one unconstrained type. The equilibrium allows discrimination among constrained types.
Environment 2. There are three types of agents, and a single state. Each agent is given
the same utility function as in (57) with 훾 = 2. Each type consists of 13 fraction of the
population, i.e. 훼ℎ = 13 . Similar to the previous example, 훽 = 1, and 푅 = 1. The
endowment proﬁle is given in Table 4 below. Note that to conserve on space we do not
present an equilibrium with externality of this economy.
Table 4: Endowment proﬁles of the agents.
Type of Agents 푒ℎ10 푒
ℎ
20 푒
ℎ
11 푒
ℎ
21
ℎ = 1 12.53 11.5 0.5 0.5
ℎ = 2 12.53 0.5 7 5
ℎ = 3 12.53 0.5 5 7
With large endowments in 푡 = 1, agent 2 and agent 3 want to move resources forward to
푡 = 0. The scarcity of collateral then implies that both of them will be collateral constrained.
In addition, type 2 has the larger ratio of period-1 endowment of good 1 to good 2
푒ℎ11
푒ℎ21
than
type 3. As shown below, this diﬀerence suggests that agent 2 will be in a higher price-island
than agent 3 in equilibrium. In addition, in a competitive equilibrium with price-islands,
an agent type 2 is better oﬀ than an agent type 3. Intuitively, agent 2 holds lots of good 1
in period 1 when it is valuable while agent 3 holds lots of good 2 in period 1 when it is not
so valuable.
A competitive equilibrium allocation with price-islands is presented in Table 5 below.
Note that the equilibrium reported here is a competitive equilibrium without lump sum
transfers9. Interestingly, there are two active price islands, 푧 = 0.6028 and 푧 = 0.8167. The
price island 푧 = 0.6028 consists of some fraction of agents type-1, and all of agents type-3 (a
constrained type). On the other hand, the price island 푧 = 0.8167 consists of some fraction
of agents type-1, and all of agents type-2 (a constrained type). Technically, lotteries are
optimal because the collateral constraints create a non-convexity problem (see Lemma 3).
In particular, a convex combination over both islands of the equilibrium allocations of Table
5 is not attainable.
Similar to the previous example, all security trades are equivalent to spot trades; that
is, all of them can be replicated by trading in spot markets. In particular, agent 2 and agent
3 buy good 2 and sell good 1 in the spot markets, and vice versa for agent 1. In addition,
agent 1’s security trading varies across price-islands. This is because diﬀerent islands have
diﬀerent spot prices. Notice also that there are more of agents type 1 in island 푧 = 0.8167
9The Pareto weight for this particular equilibrium is given by 휆1 = 0.5571, 휆2 = 0.3511, 휆3 = 0.0918
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Table 5: Equilibrium allocation of (non-zero-mass) lotteries. There are multiple active price islands; 푧 =
0.6028 and 푧 = 0.8167.
ℎ = 1 ℎ = 2 ℎ = 3
푘ℎ 6.5144 4.6287 0.0000 0.0000
휃ˆℎ 1.4022 1.6582 -1.3111 -0.2935
휃ℎ -3.8588 -2.4861 1.9657 0.8077
푧 0.6028 0.8167 0.8167 0.6028
mass: 푥ℎ(푏) 0.2093 0.7907 1.0000 1.0000
than in island 푧 = 0.6028. This follows from the consistency constraints; that is, the market
fundamental in each island has to be equal to the speciﬁed level10.
Interestingly, agent 2 and agent 3 have diﬀerent consumption allocations in period 0
even though they have the same endowment in period 0. This is because they trade in
diﬀerent price-islands, and thereby receive diﬀerent wealth transfers. In particular, using
the allocation in Table 5 and the prices in Table 6, agent 2 receives −푃Δ(푧 = 0.8167)Δ =
−2.2098 × (−2.9165) = 6.4449 units of good 1 at 푡 = 0 while agent 3 receives −푃Δ(푧 =
0.6028)Δ = −0.7651× (−0.7804) = 0.5971 units of good 1 at 푡 = 0.
Equilibrium fees of price-islands, including the fees of inactive (out-of equilibrium) is-
lands are summarized in Table 3 below.
Table 6: Equilibrium fees of price-islands. The bold numbers are (actively traded) equilibrium prices. Note:
they are not adjacent.
푧 = 0.4500 z = 0.6028 푧 = 0.7028 푧 = 0.7667 z = 0.8167 푧 = 0.8667
푃Δ(푧) 0.2717 0.7651 1.7619 1.8117 2.2098 2.7253
In addition, the expected utility of an agent type 1, type 2, and type 3 are U 1 =
−1.3123,U 2 = −0.9117,U 3 = −1.4982, respectively. Agent 2 is signiﬁcantly better oﬀ
than agent 3. Note that they have the same period 0 endowment. The diﬀerence comes
from two sources. The ﬁrst one is the diﬀerence in their period 1 endowments, as discussed
earlier. This part is true even in the collateral equilibrium with the externality11. The
second one is the large diﬀerence in receiving transfers in period 0 from trading in price
island (푇2 = 6.4449 > 푇3 = 0.5971). This part is only true in the competitive equilibrium
with price-islands12. Notice also that a constrained agent type 2 is better oﬀ than being
in the ﬁrst-best world, where she will receive expected utility U 2 = −0.9600. This implies
that constrained does not necessary mean worse-oﬀ. This is the general equilibrium eﬀect.
10For instance, the average of good 1 in island 푧 = 0.8167 is 0.7907×0.5+1.000×7 = 7.3953, and average
of good 2 in island 푧 = 0.8167 is 0.7907×(4.6287+0.5)+1.000×5 = 9.0553. Hence, the market fundamental
in island 푧 = 0.8167 is 7.3953
9.0553
= 0.8167.
11The diﬀerence between agent 2 and agent 3 in the collateral equilibrium is not as large as in the
competitive equilibrium with price-islands, i.e., U 2 = −1.6452,U 3 = −1.9786. Though, both of them are
strictly better oﬀ in the competitive equilibrium with price-islands. See the supplementary materials for the
detailed derivation.
12Note also that agent 2 beneﬁts from the availability of the lotteries in that it allows her to be in a higher
market fundamental island (푧 = 0.8167), which means a larger transfer, than otherwise (푧 = 0.7133).
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The last economy illustrates an economy with uncertainty where directly collateralized
securities, 휓ˆ, are actively traded. All agents are constrained, but at diﬀerent states. In
particular, an agent will be binding in a state where her endowment is large. This is
because she would like to transfer a part of such a large amount of wealth forward to 푡 = 0
but cannot do so because of the collateral constraints.
Environment 3. The economy in this example is similar to the one in example 1, but
there are two states, 푆 = 2. There are two types of agents, 퐻 = 2, both of which have an
identical constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function (57) with 훾 = 2. Each type
consists of 12 fraction of the population, i.e. 훼
ℎ = 12 . In addition, the discount factor 훽 = 1.
The storage technology is constant and given by 푅푠 = 1 for 푠 = 1, 2. The endowment proﬁle
is presented in Table 7. Note that the agents are ex-ante identical. But agent type 1 has
relative more of both goods in state 푠 = 1 than in state 푠 = 2 and vice versa for agent type
2.
Table 7: Endowment proﬁles of the agents.
푒ℎ10 푒
ℎ
20 푒
ℎ
11 푒
ℎ
21 푒
ℎ
12 푒
ℎ
22
ℎ = 1 2 2 3 3 1 1
ℎ = 2 2 2 1 1 3 3
First, the symmetry of the endowments and preferences implies that period-0 allocation
should be the same for all agents; that is, 푐ℎ10 = 푐10 and 푐
ℎ
20 = 푐20, for all ℎ. Further, the
indeterminacy between 푘ℎ and 휃ℎ(푠) implies that there is no loss of generality in considering
the case with symmetric collateral allocation, i.e. 푘ℎ = 푘, for all ℎ.
We will now solve for a competitive equilibrium with the externality. The detailed
derivation is omitted and presented in the supplementary materials. The unique competitive
equilibrium with the externality of this economy has 푘ℎ = 푘 ≈ 0.4603, for all ℎ. Accordingly,
the market fundamental and spot price are 푧푠 = 0.8129 and 푝(푧푠) = 0.6608, respectively,
for all 푠. The price of good-2 in period 0, prices of contracts are 푃 푒푥푡20 = 1.6872, 푃ˆ
푒푥푡
푠 =
1.2766, 푃 푒푥푡푠 = 0.8436, respectively (“ext” stands for externality).
Recall that 휃ˆℎ푠 and 휃
ℎ
푠 include directly-collateralized and asset-backed securities. Never-
theless, we now can recover the positions of each securities13. Of special interest, directly-
collateralized securities (or borrowing contracts) are 휓ˆ11 = −휓ˆ21 = −0.3042 = −휓ˆ12 = 휓ˆ22. In
words, an agent ℎ = 1 issues (borrows) 휓ˆ11 = −0.3042 units of directly-collateralized security
paying good 1 at 푠 = 1, and vice versa for an agent ℎ = 2. Figure 3a illustrates securities
traded in equilibrium. Here, as discussed earlier, all asset-back securities are equivalent to
spot trades14.
We now turn to the competitive equilibrium with price-islands. As mentioned earlier,
the equilibrium allocation reported here is a numerical solution to the Pareto program (29)
corresponding to a competitive equilibrium without transfers. Each type of agent holds
the same amount of collateral good 푘ℎ = 0.4200 < 0.4603 which is less than the one in
13This can be done using equations (77)-(80) in the proof of Lemma 4
14Here agents trade only securities paying good 1. Though, as in the proof of Lemma 6, there is an
equivalent allocation at which only securities paying good 2 are traded.
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Figure 6: (a) Point C is the period-1 equilibrium allocation with the externality. (b) Point D is the period-1
equilibrium allocation without the externality.
competitive equilibrium with the externality. As a result, the market fundamental and
the spot price of good 2 in each state 푠 is higher here, i.e., 푧푠 = 0.8285 > 0.8129 and
푝(푧푠) = 0.6864 > 0.6608. In addition, the price of good-2 in period 0 is 푃20 = 1.5903 <
푃 푒푥푡20 = 1.6872, which is again lower than the one in the competitive equilibrium with the
externality.
We can recover the positions of each security using the same approach as in the com-
petitive equilibrium with the externality. Directly-collateralized securities (or borrowing
contracts) are 휓ˆ11 = −휓ˆ21 = −0.2872 = −휓ˆ12 = 휓ˆ22. In words, an agent ℎ = 1 issues (bor-
rows) 휓ˆ11 = −0.2872 units of directly-collateralized security paying good 1 at 푠 = 1 in an
island 푧1 = 0.8285 at a unit price 푃ˆ푎(푧1, 1) = 1.2936, and vice versa for an agent ℎ = 2.
Again, all asset-back securities are equivalent to spot trades. The equilibrium without the
externality is also illustrated in ﬁgure 3b. Note that agents trade less securities relative to
the equilibrium with the externality. This is because the agents save less, and are issuing
fewer securities. That is, the externality generates too much borrowing.
10. Concluding Remarks
As we write this, the world ﬁnancial markets are in much turmoil. Needless to say we do
not attempt here to model all possible problems and corresponding solutions. Rather we use
theory to try to pinpoint one important aspect of what is going on: default, the consequent
use of collateral which moves intertemporal endowments, and endogenous spot prices at
the time of repayment decisions all interact to create an externality. It is in this sense that
in our model markets do not function eﬃciently. Essentially all traders take spot prices
as given when deciding what claims to buy and issue, and those that issue in the initial
securities market need to back their promises with collateral, which determines subsequent
spot market prices. This simultaneity happens in complete market set ups without frictions
as well, but in our model the set of feasible trades for each agents depends on equilibrium
36
spot market prices, so agents are imposing an externality on one another when they each
make their own decisions.
Our solution to this problem is equally intuitive: create a market in the spot market
price itself, that is allow agents to contract on what price they will unwind their contract
commitments, over and above contracting on intertemporal or state-contingent exchange.
Of course that price is still endogenous and the contract price must equal the spot market
price at which supply equals demand, taking into account exogenous endowments, saving,
and contract positions and who is in the market. So when agents contract on the spot
price they essentially are counting on having the requisite number and types of traders
around to support that contract spot price. No agent cares speciﬁcally about the identity
or name of other traders, but they do care about the composition of traders (or in our set
up with homotheticity, the ratio of pre-trade endowments). So the new market mechanism
needs to track who people are and what commitments they have made, in a certain well
deﬁned sense. Importantly, the formation of exchanges is determined by the market, so the
government or a planner is not directing traﬃc. Speciﬁcally, to support the new constrained
eﬃcient allocation, there must be an ex ante market for ex post spot markets, with prices
(fees and receipts) paid ex ante at the time of contracting for participation in these ex post
exchanges, depending on each agents type (his/her pre trade endowment inclusive of savings
to support securities). Agents are in eﬀecting buying and selling their rights to trade in
clubs, the set of agents with whom they will execute their promises and unwind positions
(but we do not use the word club in a pejorative sense, as each club has a continuum of
price taking agents).
In order to visualize more clearly the mechanics of our proposed market structure, we
try to place it in a contemporary setting. We imagine that there are two commodities,
money (good 1) and treasury obligations (good 2, the collateral good). Even though money
and treasuries can not be consumed directly, as can the commodities of our model, each
participant (ﬁnancial institutions, e.g., banks, insurance companies, hedge funds) derives
an indirect utility from holding them today and also from holding them tomorrow (due to
reasons that we do not model here). But the utility is less from treasuries when they used
as collateral backing promises to pay. In the initial date these ﬁnancial players borrow and
lend in securities markets and buy insurance obligations, with loans and insurance contracts
dominated in money. The market fundamental in future spot markets then is determined
by the relative ratio of money to treasuries, equivalently the interest rate at that time. In
addition, some market participants buy for cash one among a range of market exchange
certiﬁcates designating the future spot price of treasures. Other participants are paid to
hold one of a range market exchange certiﬁcates. (In some instances certiﬁcates are issued at
random, after the price is paid). This arrangement is essentially oﬀers insurance against the
uncertain spot price of treasuries, but the market in the certiﬁcates in eﬀect restricts the set
of traders with whom there is a trade today and unwinding of positions tomorrow, in such a
way that the contracted insured price is the market clearing spot price. Broker-dealers will
clear all the markets for securities and markets of certiﬁcates. Of course these institutional
arrangements will require an excellent registration, to keep track of which exchange market
traders are allowed to use (and hence the securities which are held). It is important to
ensure that agents cannot participate across markets where they do not have the right to
buy and sell and unwind trades, to forestall the obvious arbitrage when multiple exchanges
37
emerge in equilibrium.
Asset-backed securities are allowed in our set up and do not cause a problem. Neither
are they essential here in that various combinations of securities and markets are equivalent.
Essentially asset back security trades mimic spot market trade, and are an essentially part
of the set up if and only if spot market exchange is for some reason more limited. As a result,
all arguments stated in terms of spot markets can be restated using asset back securities.
In particular, we can solve the externality problem by creating segregated exchanges where
agents can trade ex ante collateralized and asset backed securities indexed by the market
fundamental.
Our methods extend to other set ups in which spot market exchange is desirable or
cannot be limited a priori. First, this model can be readily extended to incorporate
the contract-speciﬁc collateralization without pyramiding and tranching as in Geanakoplos
(2003), among others. In this case, spot trades will be necessary and cannot be substituted
by ex-ante contracting. Second, this model can also be extended to general preferences and
dynamic environments. This extended version will be used to study equilibrium cascades.
This is again closely related to Geanakoplos (2003). Third, we can use our approach to
study retrading or anonymous trading in spot markets under moral hazard environments.
This is related to Acemoglu and Simsek (2008).
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A. More Results and Proofs
A.1. Pooling Collateral versus Tranching
This section shows that the markets economize on collateral; that is, there is no gain
from pooling collateral across agents type h. Let the collateral constraints with pooling be:
푝(푧푠)푅푠퐾 ≥ −
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ푝(푧푠) min
{
0, 휓ℎ푠
}
−
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ min
{
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
}
(58)
where the average collateral 퐾 =
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푘ℎ. We then show that the group collateral con-
straint is equivalent to individuals collateral constraints (4).
Lemma 9. For any allocation
(
푘ℎ, 휓ℎ푠 , 휏
ℎ
푠 , 휏ˆ
ℎ
푠
)
satisfying the collateral constraints (58), then
there exists there exists an equivalent allocation
(
푘′ℎ, 휓′ℎ푠 , 휏ℎ푠 , 휏ˆℎ푠
)
with
푘′1 =
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푘ℎ푠
훼1
, and 푘′ℎ = 0 for ℎ ∕= 1 (59)
휓′ℎ푠 =
(
푅푠푘
ℎ
푠 + 휓
ℎ
푠
)
−푅푠푘′ℎ (60)
where 푘ℎ푠 =
−푝(푧푠) min(0,휓ℎ푠 )−min(0,휓ˆℎ푠 )
푝(푧푠)푅푠
,∀푠.
Proof. This result can be proved in two steps: (i) show that the collateral constraints (58)
hold if and only if there exists 푘ℎ푠 such that (4) hold, (ii) then show that any allocation
with state-contingent collateral, 푘ℎ푠 , can be replicated by an allocation with ﬁxed collateral
allocation 푘ℎ.
Step I: =⇒ Suppose that collateral constraints (58) hold. Now consider an alternative
allocation with
푘ℎ푠 =
−푝(푧푠) min
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)−min(0, 휓ˆℎ푠)
푝(푧푠)푅푠
,∀푠 (61)
This clearly implies no default. We then only need to show that the average collateral
needed
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푘ℎ푠 is no larger than 퐾. Summing the above equation over ℎ with weight 훼
ℎ
gives, for each 푠,
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ푘ℎ푠 =
∑
ℎ
훼ℎ
−푝(푧푠) min
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)−min(0, 휓ˆℎ푠)
푝(푧푠)푅푠
(62)
≤ 퐾 (63)
where the last inequality follows from the group collateral constraints (58).
⇐= This can be done by summing over the individuals collateral constraints with weight
훼ℎ.
Step II: Let
(
푘ℎ푠 , 휓
ℎ
푠 , 휏
ℎ
푠 , 휏ˆ
ℎ
푠
)
be an attainable allocation with contingent collateral; that is,
it satisﬁes the collateral constraint for each ℎ and 푠:
푅푠푘
ℎ
푠 ≥ −min
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)
(64)
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and the average collateral is the same in every state; 퐾 =
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푘ℎ푠 for all 푠. In addition,
the consumption allocation of agent ℎ in state 푠 is given by
푐ℎ1푠 = 푒
ℎ
1푠 + 휏ˆ
ℎ
푠 (65)
푐ℎ2푠 = 푒
ℎ
2푠 +
(
푅푠푘
ℎ
푠 + 휓
ℎ
푠
)
+ 휏ℎ푠 (66)
where the spot trade satisﬁes:
휏ˆℎ푠 + 푝(푧푠)휏
ℎ
푠 = 0 (67)
Now consider a candidate allocation
(
푘′ℎ, 휓′ℎ푠 , 휏 ′ℎ푠 , 휏ˆ ′ℎ푠
)
with
푘′1 =
퐾
훼1
, and 푘′ℎ = 0 for ℎ ∕= 1 (68)
휓′ℎ푠 =
(
푅푠푘
ℎ
푠 + 휓
ℎ
푠
)
−푅푠푘′ℎ (69)
휏ˆ ′ℎ푠 = 휏ˆ
ℎ
푠 , and 휏
′ℎ
푠 = 휏
ℎ
푠 (70)
Using (68), we can write the securities as
휓′1푠 =
(
푅푠푘
1
푠 + 휓
1
푠
)− 푘′1 (71)
휓′ℎ = 푅푠푘ℎ푠 + 휓
ℎ
푠 for ℎ ∕= 1 (72)
Using the collateral constraint (64) we can show that for each ℎ ∕= 1:
휓′ℎ푠 = 푅푠푘
ℎ
푠 + 휓
ℎ
푠 ≥ 푅푠푘ℎ푠 + min
{
0, 휓ℎ푠
}
≥ 0 (73)
where the last inequality follows from the collateral constraint (64). This, 휓′ℎ푠 ≥ 0, implies
that the collateral constraint for any ℎ ∕= 1 holds (since he does not issue securities at all).
We hence only need to show that the collateral constraint also holds for ℎ = 1. We can
rewrite (71) as
푘′1 =
(
푅푠푘
1
푠 + 휓
1
푠
)− 휓′1푠 ≥ −휓′1푠 (74)
where the last inequality follows from the collateral constraint (64) for ℎ = 1. This shows
that the collateral constraint also holds for ℎ = 1.
Given that
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푘′ℎ푠 = 퐾 =
∑
ℎ 훼
ℎ푘ℎ푠 , the market fundamentals are the same for every
state. With the same market fundamental, 푧푠, the spot trade is satisﬁed, using (70).
Now we will show that the consumption allocations ar also the same.
푐′ℎ1푠 = 푒
ℎ
1푠 + 휏ˆ
′ℎ
푠 = 푒
ℎ
1푠 + 휏ˆ
ℎ
푠 = 푐
ℎ
1푠 (75)
where the second equality follows from (70), and the last one follows from (65). Similarly,
푐′ℎ2푠 = 푒
ℎ
2푠 +
(
푅푠푘
′ℎ
푠 + 휓
′ℎ
푠
)
+ 휏 ′ℎ푠 = 푒
ℎ
2푠 +
(
푅푠푘
′ℎ
푠 +
(
푅푠푘
ℎ
푠 + 휓
ℎ
푠 −푅푠푘′ℎ
))
+ 휏ℎ푠
= 푒ℎ2푠 +
(
푅푠푘
ℎ
푠 + 휓
ℎ
푠
)
+ 휏ℎ푠 = 푐
ℎ
2푠 (76)
where the second equality follows from (69) and (70), and the last one follows from (66).
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 4. The ﬁrst statement can be proved as follows. First, it is clear that
conditions (48) imply (10)-(11). We now only need to show that (45), (46), and (47) imply
(4). Summing up all collateral requirement conditions, (45), (46), and (47), and using the
fact that max (0, 푥) + min (0, 푥) = 푥 give, for an agent ℎ in state 푠,
푝(푧푠)푅푠푘
ℎ +
[
휓ˆℎ푠 + 휎ˆ
ℎ
푠 + 휈ˆ
ℎ
푠
]
+ 푝(푧푠)
[
휓ℎ푠 + 휎
ℎ
푠 + 휈
ℎ
푠
]
≥ 0
which is the collateral constraint for an agent ℎ in state 푠 where 휃ˆℎ푠 = 휓ˆ
ℎ
푠 + 휎ˆ
ℎ
푠 + 휈ˆ
ℎ
푠 and
휃ℎ푠 = 휓
ℎ
푠 + 휎
ℎ
푠 + 휈
ℎ
푠 .
The second statement is proved as follows. Consider an allocation
(
푘ℎ, 휃ˆℎ푠 , 휃
ℎ
푠
)
ℎ
that sat-
isﬁes (4) and (10)-(11). We will now choose a corresponding allocation
(
푘ℎ, 휓ˆℎ푠 , 휓
ℎ
푠 , 휎ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휎
ℎ
푠 , 휈ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휈
ℎ
푠
)
ℎ
that satisﬁes 휃ˆℎ푠 = 휓ˆ
ℎ
푠 + 휎ˆ
ℎ
푠 + 휈ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휃
ℎ
푠 = 휓
ℎ
푠 + 휎
ℎ
푠 + 휈
ℎ
푠 , the collateral requirement conditions
(45), (46), (47), and the market-clearing conditions (48). Consider the following candidate
allocation:
휓ˆℎ푠 = 휃ˆ
ℎ
푠 + 푝(푧푠)휃
ℎ
푠 (77)
휓ℎ푠 = 휈ˆ
ℎ
푠 = 휈
ℎ
푠 = 0 (78)
휎ˆℎ푠 = 휃ˆ
ℎ
푠 − 휓ˆℎ푠 = −푝(푧푠)휃ℎ푠 (79)
휎ℎ푠 = 휃
ℎ
푠 (80)
(78) implies that agents hold no 휓ℎ푠 , 휈ˆ
ℎ
푠 , 휈
ℎ
푠 ; they will borrow or lend through directly col-
lateralized contract paying in good-1 휓ˆℎ푠 only.
It is straightforward to show that resource constraints (48) hold. Since the resource
constraints are satisﬁed and the collateral allocations 푘ℎ are the same, the market funda-
mentals are the same. We now would like to show that collateral requirement conditions
(45), (46), (47) also hold. First, we will show that (46) and (47) hold. There are two cases
to consider; (i) 휃ℎ푠 > 0, (ii) 휃
ℎ
푠 < 0. Case I: Suppose that 휃
ℎ
푠 > 0. Using (80), this implies
that 휎ℎ푠 > 0, which in turn leads to min
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
= 0. On the other hand, it is true that
max
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
+ max
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
= max
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
+ max
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
+ 휈ˆℎ푠 ≥ 0
where the ﬁrst equality follows from (78). Since min
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
= 0, we have
max
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
+ max
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
= max
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
+ max
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
+ 휈ˆℎ푠 ≥ −푝(푧푠) min
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
which is (47). On the other hand, (79) implies that 휎ˆℎ푠 < 0 when 휃
ℎ
푠 > 0. As a result,
min
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
= 휎ˆℎ푠 . Using (78), (79), (80), we then can show that
푝(푧푠) max
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)
+ 푝(푧푠) max
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
+ 푝(푧푠)휈
ℎ
푠 + min
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
= 0 + 푝(푧푠)휎
ℎ
푠 + 0 + 휎ˆ
ℎ
푠 = 푝(푧푠)휃
ℎ
푠 − 푝(푧푠)휃ℎ푠 = 0
where the second equality follows from (79) and (80). This shows that (46) holds.
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Case II: Suppose that 휃ℎ푠 < 0. (79) and (80) imply that max
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
= 휎ˆℎ푠 = −푝(푧푠)휃ℎ푠
and min
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
= 휎ℎ푠 = 휃
ℎ
푠 , respectively. We then can write
max
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
+ max
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
+ 휈ˆℎ푠 = max
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
− 푝(푧푠)휃ℎ푠 ≥ −푝(푧푠)휃ℎ푠 = −푝(푧푠) min
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
which is exactly (47). Note that the ﬁrst equality follows from (78), the second inequal-
ity follows from the fact that max
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
≥ 0. Similarly, using , we can show that
max
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
= min
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
= 0. This implies that
푝(푧푠) max
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)
+ 푝(푧푠) max
(
0, 휎ℎ푠
)
+ 푝(푧푠)휈
ℎ
푠 + min
(
0, 휎ˆℎ푠
)
= 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0
which is exactly (46).
Similarly, we can now show that (45) also holds. There are two cases to be considered
as well.
Case I: suppose that 휃ˆℎ푠 + 푝(푧푠)휃
ℎ
푠 < 0. (77) implies that 휓ˆ
ℎ
푠 < 0, which in turn implies
that min
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
= 휓ˆℎ푠 = 휃ˆ
ℎ
푠 + 푝(푧푠)휃
ℎ
푠 . Using (78), we now can show that
푝(푧푠)푅푠푘
ℎ + min
(
0, 휓ˆℎ푠
)
+ 푝(푧푠) min
(
0, 휓ℎ푠
)
= 푝(푧푠)푅푠푘
ℎ + 휃ˆℎ푠 + 푝(푧푠)휃
ℎ
푠 + 0 ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows (4). This implies that (45) holds.
Case II: we can use a similar argument to show that (45) holds when 휃ˆℎ푠 + 푝(푧푠)휃
ℎ
푠 =
휓ˆℎ푠 > 0. In summary, we have show that all collateral requirement conditions hold. Q.E.D.
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